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Director's Note

DIRECTOR'S CORNER

Welcome and thank you for your interest in the Journal of Military Conflict Transformation (JMCT). The purpose of this publication is to broaden the reader's interest in the art and science of negotiations. It does not matter what occupation you serve; negotiations are a part of your daily life. As a career Security Forces member with over 30 years of active service, I have been placed in numerous situations where I have had to quickly ascertain the intent of a potential subject and what level of force to use to effectively bring an incident under control, while ensuring a safe environment for all persons. When you think through something, you are in fact negotiating, even if it is with a single party, yourself. In some situations, the result of your inner negotiation may be deadly. However, most daily negotiations are not deadly, they take place in a peaceful environment, amongst two or more parties with each trying to tactically out-manuever the other for an advantage. These negotiations typically end in an outcome that may or may not be advantageous to both parties. It is the hope of the Air Force Negotiation Center that these articles will not only open your aperture to the world of negotiations but assist you in sharpening your leadership skills. As you will see, the first journal for 2022 focuses on leadership. For instance, negotiation skills help resolve workplace disputes, reduce challenges, and enable a consensus that satisfies both parties without degrading one party's value. Thank you and enjoy the latest edition of the JMCT.

Christopher Lacek, LT Col

AFNC Director



Editor's Welcome

Welcome to the Spring 2022 issue of the Journal of Military Conflict Transformation!

Many individuals at the Air Force Negotiation Center and Air University endeavored to provide content and editorial support to make this issue possible, despite personal and professional challenges impacted by the pandemic. As we spent more time working from home and navigating our communities during the pandemic it became evident effective negotiation skills are critical in both our personal and professional lives. This issue contains articles to walk you from introspection – how to look within at your behaviors, to extrospection -how to recognize and react to things out of your control. We hope this Spring issue provides you with an opportunity for reflection and even some soul-searching. Most importantly, you will find some valuable tools within these pages to help you perform better as both a leader and a follower.

The overarching theme of this issue is leadership. The role of a leader is demanding and broad. Do you, as a leader, consider how your actions impact those around you – across the organization – perhaps throughout the nation? Learning the art of reflection is an excellent tool for leaders and the first article in this journal is a short concept analysis on resilience. We as leaders must be keenly aware of how people adapt to different environmental factors such as stress, change, and adversity. Such awareness is a key component of another tool we will discuss emotional intelligence!

Emotional intelligence strategies are the focus of the second article. These strategies are tools that help leaders and followers overcome and prevent organizational toxicity. We have all experienced organizational toxicity and perhaps have been at the root of such toxicity – even though we may not have been aware of a problem. Behaviors that cause organizational toxicity can be both consciously and unconsciously committed by members. The best way to arm yourself is to learn about emotional intelligence – what it is and how to use it for the betterment of your organization, your community, and your family. The third article is a short thought-provoking model focused on teaching ethics. Every Airman strives to perform ethically, yet there are failures, and those failures can seriously impact operational success.

This article links the strategies provided in the articles on Resilience and Emotional Intelligence and makes a case for the idea that moral leaders beget moral followers! How do leaders learn how to negotiate? An informative article is presented which explores realistic and command-centered practices in learning related to negotiations. Certainly, important skills to learn before an individual assumes command and leadership roles, this article speaks to the heart of the negotiations process and recognizes its importance at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of leadership functions.

The following article speaks directly to how Air Force leaders need to develop conflict management strategies and recognize when a neutral party may be the best solution. The final article in the journal presents ideas for a framework for changing an adversary's behavior. The ideas of the authors are presented through two historical but relevant case studies. The premise of the paper asserts that when any action is taken by one party, the response is met by a human domain, and behavioral change is possible. You will find a variety of ideas in the journal, and most importantly, tools from which to draw upon when faced with conflict at a very personal level, to leading through effective negotiation on a grand scale with probable global implications. The leader's toolbox for negotiation strategies should always be accessible.

It is our hope at the Air Force Negotiation Center that the tools provided by these articles will be included in your toolbox. To learn more about the Air Force Negotiation Center and the courses we offer, please go to <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFNC/>. While you are there, check out our "Call for Papers" for the November issue of the Journal of Military Conflict Transformation! We would love to hear from you!

Patricia A. Payne, PhD

AFNC Publications Manager
Editor-in-Chief, JMCT



Resiliency : A CONCEPT ANALYSIS

ANGELA M. LACEK

Abstract

Resiliency is a term often used in the context of mental health, despite the fact that the definition varies amongst fields of academic researchers and populations. The aim of this article is to perform a concept analysis using Walker and Avant's Concept Analysis Framework¹ and to provide a standard definition of resilience. Resilience was defined as an individual's ability to adapt to environmental factors such as stress, change, or adversity in a positive and productive manner. The attributes of resiliency were identified as strength, positive coping, mental toughness, and elasticity. While largely an individual construct, evidence suggests that people with social connectedness tend to display higher levels of resilience. This makes it imperative that USAF leaders at all levels take the time to invest in their members and seek opportunities to develop coping skills and build resilience.

Resiliency is a term that is frequently used in the context of mental health, stress management, and the overall well-being of an individual. An internet search of "resiliency" results in multiple findings; among them various definitions, articles that try to explain what the concept means, and quizzes that can test an individual's level of resilience.

The word "resilience" conjures images of strength, determination, and even stoicism. Resiliency is referenced as an individual construct, but also in terms of families, teams, and organizations. In psychology, resiliency is often referring to how someone "bounces back" after facing adversity. One article in the psychological literature discussed resilience in the context of vulnerability in risk from an environmental or genetic determinate; specifically, what variants cause people to react differently to the same experience.²

In the military, the term is used in a similar manner to bouncing back, but it is often in the context of workplace stress or related to a deployed experience. It is also thought to be a character trait that can be built upon or strengthened through mental discipline and self-reflection.

Despite the fact that the word is so commonly used in various contexts, there is still discussion on what resiliency means and, more importantly, how to build it. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of resiliency using Walker and Avant's Concept Analysis Framework (2011) (Table 1).

Steps of Analysis	Description
1. Choose a Concept	Select a concept to analyze.
2. Determine Aim of Analysis	Focus on the purpose and intention of analysis in order to clarify and develop the concept, and propose a definition.
3. Use of Concept	Conduct a review of the literature to determine all of the uses of the concept.
4. Defining Attributes	Identify the qualities most frequently associated with the concept.
5. Model Case	A sample case that demonstrates all of the defining attributes.
6. Additional Cases	Related, borderline, and contrary cases are sample cases that are frequently used to illustrate and help define what the concept is or is not.
7. Antecedents and Consequences	Antecedents are events or incidents that must happen prior to the occurrence of the concept. Consequences are events that occur as a direct result of the concept.
8. Empirical Referents	Ways to measure the concepts.

Use of the Concept

Definition

Resiliency is a verb for the noun “resilience”; both terms are used interchangeably in this paper.

Resilience is defined by Merriam-Webster (n.d.) as (noun) 1: the ability to become strong, healthy, or successful again after something bad happens; 2: an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change, 3: the ability of something to return to its original shape after it has been pulled, stretched, pressed, bent, etc.³ Psychology Dictionary defines resilience as “the ability to adapt or rebound quickly from change, illness, or bad fortune”. Terms linked to this concept are neural plasticity, psychosocial rehabilitation, functional plasticity, psychogenesis, social skills, and emotion-focused coping.⁴

A narrative review of the scholarly literature by Herrman et al.⁵ examined multiple definitions of resiliency, which included “the protective factors and processes or mechanisms that contribute to a good outcome, despite experiences with stressors shown to carry significant risk for developing psychopathology”; “an interactive concept that refers to relative resistance to environmental risks or overcoming stress or adversity”; “a dynamic process of positive adaptation in the context of significant adversity”; and “multi-dimensional characteristics that vary with context, time, age, gender, and cultural origin, as well as within an individual subject to different life circumstances”.

The authors acknowledge that despite a lack of consensus, most definitions use similar domains as evidence of resilience such as biological, psychological, dispositional attributes, and social support.⁶ For the purpose of this concept analysis, resilience is defined as an individual's ability to adapt to environmental factors such as stress, change, or adversity in a positive and productive manner.



Resilience is defined as the ability to adapt or rebound quickly from change, illness, or badfortune.

In the Literature

An exhaustive search of the scholarly literature was performed using the following key terms: *resiliency*, *what is resiliency*, *what is resilience*, *military resilience*, *resilience and mental health*, *definition of resilience*, and *what makes a person resilient*. Further search criteria included peer reviewed, English language, and availability of full text. After reviewing the abstracts, articles that focused on understanding the meaning of resilience in the context of individuals were prioritized for inclusion.

Literature that focused on organizational resilience, biogenetics, computer/network systems, cybersecurity, criminology, and environmental sciences were excluded. Based on the working definition of resilience, six articles were examined for this paper (Table 2), discussed below.

Rutter examined research on the topic of resilience to determine if there is a gap in the literature that needs to be further studied.⁷ He argued that resilience is a dynamic concept, with a wide range of responses between people to the same environmental risk or adverse event. While some people will become sensitized to an event, others may find that same adverse event to have a "steeling" effect. It is not always possible to determine how an event will impact a person, but their response may be shaped by social contexts, personality dispositions, a nurturing environment, and external societal support systems. He further reported that while environmental risks and protective measures are nested in the same general category of resilience, they are not the same, thus they cannot be predictive in nature and should be studied separately.⁸

Gibbons et al.⁹ studied military health care workers that were deployed to an area of conflict to understand the varied responses to traumatic situations by identifying perceptions of control and self-efficacy, appraisal styles, and coping strategies. The authors administered a descriptive questionnaire, the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist—Military Version (PCL-M), the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSES), and performed an interview with 20 personnel that did not develop PTSD. They found that positive prevention mechanisms such as protective measures, uplifting activities, efficacy, connectedness, and hope correlated with higher levels of resilience.¹⁰

Herrman et al.¹¹ performed a narrative review of scholarly articles written between 2006 and 2011 to examine definitions of resilience and the range of factors understood as contributing to resilience in the areas of clinical healthcare and public health. They acknowledged that while the definitions have evolved over time, resilience is fundamentally a positive adaptation in which an individual is able to maintain or regain mental health, despite experiencing adversity. They determined that factors associated with higher resilience are likely cumulative, such as having a positive upbringing may lead to higher self-esteem, self-confidence, and more social interactions; all of which enhance resilience.¹²

An integrative review performed by Aburn, Gott, and Hoare¹³ examined the definition of resilience in the empirical literature across different fields of research and studied populations. Using the methodology described by Whittemore and Knaf¹⁴, the authors reviewed over 2,000 studies, including 100 articles in the final review. The inclusive articles were published in a variety of fields and across differing populations; including but not limited to military, nursing, healthcare, psychology, education, and community policing.

After synthesizing the data, the authors identified five key characteristics of resilience: (1) rising above to overcome adversity, (2) adaptation and adjustment, (3) "ordinary magic", (4) good mental health as a proxy for resilience, and (5) the ability to bounce back.¹⁵ "Ordinary magic" is defined as an everyday attribute inherent in all people; a phenomenon not easily measured, but grounded in ordinary things that build resilience, such as friends, family, and love.¹⁶

The authors determined while the term "resilience" is used frequently in multiple contexts and fields of research, there is no universal definition. When studying resilience, researchers should define the term within the contextual nature of the studied field and/or population.¹⁷

Feldman approached the topic of resilience from a sociological perspective, arguing that the current studies of resilience in clinical science focus on neurobiological aspects, such as stress and fear regulation, and therefore incorrectly surmises that in order to be resilient, an individual needs to first experience a traumatic event.¹⁸ She argues that this is problematic in that there is no clear definition, construct, or empirical evidence that identifies whether an event degrades or promotes resilience following an insult.



Social behaviors and bonding, especially in early childhood, can fortify affiliation-related brain networks, thus improve development of resilience.

The author proposed a model of resilience based on the neurobiology of affiliation and three core tenets of resilience: plasticity, sociality, and meaning; specifically looking at biological and social evolutionary markers that may predispose someone to higher levels of self-protection when faced with adversity. The author followed three longitudinal studies with cohorts of mothers and infants from birth to adolescence that had experienced adverse life events (maternal postpartum depression, prematurity, and families exposed to war) to understand how affiliate social systems help mitigate stress.

Based on the findings, the author concluded that social behaviors and bonding, especially in early childhood, can fortify affiliation-related brain networks, thus improve development of resilience and help shape the social brain.¹⁹

Windle²⁰ performed a concept analysis similar to this paper with the aim of defining and exploring the concept of resiliency using a systematic, theoretical framework intended to inform future research. The author discussed resilience in the context of the traditional dictionary definition (not unlike the definitions discussed in the paper), as well as through the lens of psychology, general life, environmental interfaces, and social contexts. The author concluded that resilience is interlaced with daily life but has deep multidisciplinary roots. His findings suggest that if the right mix of resources are provided, exposure to risks and adversity may not result in poor outcomes.²¹

Table 2. Literature used to explore the concept

Authors	Design	Definition of Resilience	Attributes	Antecedents	Consequences	Empirical Referents
Abum, Gott, & Hoare (2015)	integrative review	no universal definition noted	rising above to overcome adversity, adaptation and adjustment, ordinary magic, good mental health, ability to bounce back	trauma, challenging situations, stress, love, family, close friendships	strength, positive coping skills	Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC), Adolescent Resilience Questionnaire, presence or absence of mental illness
Feldman (2020)	theoretical model	positive outcome despite adversity	courage, perseverance, positive outlook	caregiving behavior, maternal/infant bonding, neural plasticity	empathy, compassion, wider social circle, intimate bonds	biological markers, stress hormones, cognition, mental health diagnoses (or lack thereof)
Gibbons et al (2014)	descriptive exploratory	N/A	protective measures, uplifting activities, efficacy, connectedness, hope	trauma, deployment, combat	adaptive responses (seeking social support, problem solving, goal setting, stress management), protective coping	Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist-Military Version (PCL-M), General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSES), semi-structured interviews
Herman et al (2011)	narrative review	positive adaptation despite experiencing adversity	strength, intellectual functioning, self-efficacy, self-esteem, emotional regulation, active coping	malreatment, trauma, harsh early environments, stress, homeostatic resilience	posttraumatic growth, thriving, protective factors, hardness, benefit finding	CD-RISC, Resilience Scale for Adults
Rutter (2012)	concept analysis	reduced vulnerability to risk experiences; overcoming stress or adversity	cognitive abilities, planning, self-efficacy	significant major stress or adversity, parenting quality, good schools	steeling effects, self-efficacy,	biological markers
Windle (2011)	concept analysis	the process of effectively negotiating, adapting to, or managing significant sources of stress or trauma	adapting, bouncing back, protective factors	facing adversity, resistance, isolation,	cohesion, strong social network, stability, motivation, steeling effects	non-specific resilience measurement scales/instruments

Defining Attributes

The literature search identified four defining attributes of resiliency: strength, positive coping, mental toughness, and elasticity. In this context, strength refers to psychological attributes that individuals can pull from when facing difficulties. Positive coping refers to healthy ways someone deals with hardship, such as self-reflective measures, social connectedness, and self-improvements. Mental toughness is a “steeling” quality, or a hardening of the psyche to prevent negative intrusions from having a long-term effect. Elasticity is the ability to “bounce back” after an adverse event.

Antecedents and Consequences

Antecedents are defined as the events or incidents that must happen prior to the occurrence of the concept.²² In the concept of resilience, the antecedent is adversity. Based on the operational definition, in order for a person to demonstrate resilience, they will have first had to experience an adverse event. If an individual has never experienced adversity, there is no way to measure their ability to be resilient. Often, we look at someone that seems to have it all together, but they fall apart at the first sign of trouble. It is possible that they had never been tested, therefore they could not demonstrate resilience.

Consequences are events that occur as a direct result of the occurrence of the concept.²³ For resilience, a consequence is effective coping skills, such as self-reflective activities (meditation, journaling, exercise, or socializing). According to the literature, someone that is “resilient” will demonstrate strength, a sense of connectedness, and hope. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the individual comes through the adverse event unscathed, but rather that they have developed ways to thrive in spite of adversity.

Case Presentation

Walker and Avant recommend identifying sample cases to further explore the concepts being analyzed.²⁴ Model and contrary cases are presented to demonstrate the concept of resiliency. The model case will demonstrate all of the defining attributes (strength, positive coping, mental toughness, and elasticity), and as such is considered a pure case. The contrary case will have none of the defining attributes, so it will demonstrate a clear example of what the concept is not.²⁵

Model Case

MSgt Banks is a medical technician working in a busy Family Health Clinic. His father passed away one year ago, and he recently settled his estate. It has been tough, and he misses his weekly talks with his dad. On the 1-year anniversary of his father’s death, MSgt Banks and his sister are planning a memorial in their hometown where they will spread his ashes in the lake where he grew up. While he is still grieving, each day he feels stronger and happy that he is able to honor his father’s wishes. In addition to his father’s passing, MSgt Banks is going through a divorce.

His wife and two kids live locally, and he has shared custody. Due to the stressors, he was facing, he sought counseling through the Chaplain’s office. The Chaplain has encouraged him to keep a journal so that he can reflect on his life and help identify any trends in his feelings or thoughts. Additionally, MSgt Banks has signed up for a single-parent support group, and he plays on the base intermural basketball team. He feels confident in the direction he is moving and is proud that he has been able to bounce back from all of the adversity he has experienced in the last year.

This model case clearly identifies all of the defining attributes of resiliency: strength, positive coping, mental toughness, and elasticity.

Contrary Case

Lt Phi is a personnelist and has been in the USAF for one year. Prior to coming into the military, he lost his best friend in a car accident. He has also recently broken up with his college girlfriend of two years. He wasn't dealing well with his friend's death, but he had his girlfriend to talk to about it until recently. Now, he doesn't have anyone to talk to, and he doesn't feel like doing anything outside of work. He hasn't felt like exercising much lately, because he is so tired and unmotivated. Lt Phi has a fitness test coming in a few weeks, and he figures that he will score poorly, but he doesn't care.

His colleagues ask him to go to lunch or out to the club on weekends, but he has no desire to participate. Lt Phi feels like his brain is foggy, he can't think straight, he doesn't feel like talking to anyone, and he barely takes a shower. He has started drinking a few beers every evening to help him cope with the pain he is feeling. Some days, he wonders if anyone would even miss him if he died. Would they even notice if he didn't show up to work? He doubts anyone even cares.

This example clearly lacks the defining attributes of resilience. This case does not demonstrate any of the characteristics of strength, coping, mental toughness, and elasticity. Not only is Lt Phi demonstrating a lack of "steeliness", but he is also developing poor coping mechanisms, such as drinking, isolation, and poor self-care.



If you have never experienced an adverse event, your resilience has not been tested.

Empirical Referents

In accordance with the conceptual framework, empirical referents are measures of the phenomena that demonstrate the occurrence of the concept.²⁶ An empirical referent for resilience is that despite experiencing an adverse event, the person bounces back and does not experience a long-term negative outcome. More specifically, resiliency is hard to measure. If you have never experienced an adverse event, your resilience has not been tested. Thus, the phenomena can only be tested after experiencing adversity.

Three tools noted in the scholarly literature to measure resilience are The Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC), the Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA), and the Brief Resilience Scale (BRS). The CD-RISC is a 25-item measurement, developed for clinical practice to measure stress coping ability. The authors identified five factors for measure; personal competence, trust/tolerance/strengthening effects of stress, acceptance of change/secure relationships, control, and spiritual influences.²⁷

The RSA is a 37-measure tool designed to examine intrapersonal and interpersonal protective factors presumed to facilitate adaptation to psychosocial adversities. The specific measures examined are personal competence, social competence, family coherence, social support, personal structure. This instrument is often used in clinical and health psychology as an assessment of protective factors important to prevent maladjustment and psychological disorders. The BRS is a 6-item assessment used to assess individual resilience as an outcome. This scale was developed to have a specific focus on "bouncing back" from stress.²⁸

Relevance

In calendar year 2019, 137 Airmen committed suicide. This was an increase of 33% from the previous year, and the highest number of suicides on record since the USAF started tracking this statistic in 2008.²⁹ With the number of suicides on the rise in 2019, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General David L. Goldfein, ordered a tactical pause across the USAF to allow leaders at all levels to discuss issues surrounding the rise of suicide and issues that may be contributing to this problem. Resilience (or lack thereof) was mentioned numerous times as a contributing factor to the increased suicide rate. Since 2019, the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole has seen the overall suicide numbers stay steady, while the USAF has seen a slight decrease overall with 110 suicides in 2020, and 49 suicides through the 3rd quarter of 2021 (most recent data published by DoD and Orvis).^{30 31}

In the two years since General Goldfein ordered the tactical pause, the USAF and world as a whole have pivoted away from the "suicide problem" and turned its focus to a war on public health: the 2019 novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. With the number of coronavirus disease, 2019 (COVID-19) cases decreasing nationwide, pandemic support ramping down, and daily operations normalizing, it is now more important than ever that we refocus our efforts to build resilient Airmen.

Throughout the COVID-19 era, many Airmen were isolated, working from home, and unable to visit friends or family members due to mission restrictions and pandemic operations.

Simultaneously, access to military health care was often limited due to a real-world operations tempo that saw many medical personnel deploy in support of non-traditional homeland missions. This has not only stressed our fighting force but also put a large amount of stress on the caregivers that we depend on to keep our force fit to fight. Across the nation, many communities have faced social disruptions and health-related threats; in addition to record numbers of deaths, high rates of unemployment, business closures, decreased access to health care and increased stress as they adapt to these new circumstances.³²



Resilience (or lack thereof) was mentioned numerous times as a contributing factor to the increased suicide rate.

As we move away from the acute management of COVID-19, it is imperative that leaders safeguard the resiliency of our fighting force. Resiliency directly impacts mission readiness, mission performance, and the retention of the necessary, skilled forces that conduct warfighting capabilities for the USAF. The DoD needs to invest in better mechanisms to promote resiliency and maintain critical warfighting capabilities, while simultaneously taking care of the human weapon system.³³

While there are currently a multitude of programs available (i.e.: True North, Comprehensive Airman Fitness, Mental Health Outreach, Green Dot Training, etc.) there needs to be synergy among the programs to ensure that they are appropriately resourced and available to Airmen across the force. If we are truly invested in Airman Resiliency, we need to continue to fully fund these programs even when the numbers trend in a favorable direction.

Conclusion

This paper examined the idea of resilience using the Walker and Avant Concept Analysis theoretical framework. After examining various standard and scholarly definitions, resilience was defined as an individual's ability to adapt to environmental factors such as stress, change, or adversity in a positive and productive manner. The defining attributes of resiliency were identified as strength, positive coping, mental toughness, and elasticity. Resilience was determined when an individual experienced an adverse event while simultaneously displaying positive coping skills and overall good mental health and wellbeing. While resiliency is largely an individual construct, studies have shown that people with social connectedness tend to display higher levels of resilience. This makes it imperative that leaders at all levels take the time to invest in members of their organization, paying particular attention when they have unfavorable life events. In the USAF, senior leaders should empower subordinate commanders, and ensure they have appropriate resources and tools to build a resilient force, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, they should ensure that funding for resiliency platforms continues even when the suicide rates start to decline. Resiliency needs to be a forethought rather than an afterthought in the service culture.

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Emotional Intelligence

• • COMPETENCY STRATEGIES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL TOXICITY

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Abstract

*Organizational toxicity seems to be rampant over the last few decades. Is it because of the increased visibility of our leaders and coworkers enabled by technology? Are basic human violations more evident or newsworthy today based on a social sensitivity culture shift? Regardless of the renewed transparency in toxic behaviors, it is and always has been inexcusable. There is no reason for a leader, coworker, or follower to exhibit any abusive, destructive, or dehumanizing behaviors within any environment. Unfortunately, no organization is immune to bad or toxic behaviors among its members. A brief overview of how to identify toxic behaviors within organizations and incorporation of Daniel Goleman's *El Domains and Competencies*¹ to cope with everyday organizational toxicity will enlighten and liberate personnel from these inevitable outcomes. This article will focus on the use of Goleman's competencies or "building blocks" for emotional intelligence to disarm workplace dysfunction and increase organizational resilience and harmony.*

In an interview in February 2014, Dr. Jean Lipman-Blumen, professor at Claremont University, director of the Institute for Advanced Studies Leadership, and international expert in the area of toxic leadership described toxic leaders carefully. In her judgment, toxic leaders compared to bad leaders "inflict serious and enduring harm" on individuals and institutions. Any leader can have a bad day and become rude or even raise their voice without being toxic. She further explained that the toxic drive comes from an internal dysfunctional character and is manifested through external behaviors.²

How many times have you seen toxic behaviors highlighted in headline news? What about military leaders relieved of duty for creating hostile work environments, sexual harassment, abusive behaviors, misappropriation of funds, abuse of power, or other related destructive behaviors?

Have you ever worked for a toxic boss? In my time teaching and lecturing on this topic across Air University, I can attest to at least 90% of my audiences claiming they have experienced toxic bosses in their careers, many on multiple occasions (at all levels). This article will focus on *organizational* toxicity which will not only cover toxic leaders but toxic followers and all other members exhibiting what Lipman-Blumen referred to as destructive behaviors.³ It is incumbent upon all members of an organization to recognize and understand the characteristics of toxic behaviors as opposed to other non-toxic actions to serve as a lexicon to educate all others, taking a deliberate step in providing organizational awareness.

In her influential book, *The Allure of Toxic Leaders*, (2005), Lipman-Blumen developed a list that described characteristics of toxic leaders, claiming that a leader would be classified as *toxic* if they engaged in one or more of the following behaviors:

- Leaving their followers (and frequently non-followers) worse off than they found them, sometimes eliminating – by deliberately undermining, demeaning, seducing, marginalizing, intimidating, demoralizing, disenfranchising, incapacitating, imprisoning, torturing, terrorizing, or killing – many of their own people, including members of their entourage, as well as their official opponents
- Violating the basic standards of human rights of their own supporters, as well as those of other individuals and groups they do not count among their followers
- Consciously feeding their followers illusions that enhance the leader’s power and impair the followers’ capacity to act independently (e.g., persuading followers that they are the only one who can save them or the organization)
- Playing to the basest fears and needs of the followers
- Stifling constructive criticism and teaching supporters (sometimes by threats and authoritarianism) to comply with, rather than to question, the leader’s judgment and actions
- Misleading followers through deliberate untruths and misdiagnoses of issues and problems
- Subverting those structures and processes of the system intended to generate truth, justice, and excellence and engaging in unethical, illegal, and criminal acts
- Building totalitarian or narrowly dynastic regimes, including subverting the legal processes for selecting and supporting new leaders
- Failing to nurture other leaders, including their successors (with the occasional exception of blood kin), or otherwise improperly clinging to power
- Maliciously setting constituents against one another
- Treating their followers well, but persuading them to hate and/or destroy others

- Identifying scapegoats and inciting others to castigate them
- Structuring the costs of overthrowing them as a trigger for the downfall of the system they lead, thus further endangering followers and non-followers alike
- Ignoring or promoting incompetence, cronyism, and corruption.⁴

These listed behaviors range from deliberate conscious engagement to unintentional, unconscious toxic behaviors and although Lipman-Blumen uses this list to describe toxic leaders, nearly all these behaviors apply to any member of an organization.

George Reed, author of *Tarnished*, (2015), an excellent book describing how toxic leadership has impacted members of our US military describes the many faces of toxic leadership. Although Reed points out that there are is no consensus definition of toxic leadership among scholars his work outlines some familiar behaviors. Toxic leadership is an “emerging term in an emerging field” that relates to abusive supervision, petty tyranny, workplace victimization, bullying, workplace psychopathy, brutal bosses, *intolerable bosses, harassers, incivility, derailed leaders, and destructive leadership.*⁵

Additionally, Reed explains the differences between toxic and tough leaders, only those who consistently demonstrate a pattern of toxicity over time should earn the “title of toxic.” Supervisors may bark at their members for making mistakes and occasionally lose their tempers, but do not qualify as destructive. Military leadership is a tough emotional business and sometimes requires asking members to perform difficult tasks under difficult circumstances, tough leaders are not necessarily toxic leaders.⁶

In her text *Bad Leadership* (2004), Barbara Kellerman elaborates on her seven categories of bad leaders as she described the unacceptable behaviors of many leaders. After researching hundreds of cases involving not only bad leaders, but bad followers within private, public, and nonprofit sectors she divided bad leaders into seven groups: Incompetent, Rigid, Intemperate, Callous, Corrupt, Insular, and Evil.⁷ Moreover, Kellerman asserts that bad leadership falls into the two categories of *ineffective* and *unethical* leadership. Ineffective leadership is typically caused by missing traits, weak skills, strategies badly conceived, and tactics badly employed which fail to produce their desired outcomes.⁸ Leaders in the unethical category fail to differentiate between right and wrong due to their lack of good conduct and decency leading to bad decisions for their organizations.⁹ Kellerman discussed differing levels of bad behaviors as our research in toxic leadership has indicated through descriptions of “gradations,” thus validating the elusive grip on *bad* or *toxic* labels. Based on this observation, looking at Kellerman’s seven groups of bad leaders, one could easily make a case for each category falling in the toxic categories. Alan Goldman (2009) demonstrates these differences in toxic case studies describing these levels on a *toxicity continuum* ranging from trace levels of toxicity to extremely dysfunctional/highly toxic levels within organizations.¹⁰ The bottom line here is that a unit could have a range of toxicity from minor employee manipulation to organizational suicides.

“*Leaders in the unethical category fail to differentiate between right and wrong due to their lack of good conduct and decency leading to bad decisions for their organizations.*”

Emotional Intelligence (EI)

What is emotional intelligence? I recall the first day of my emotional intelligence certification course years ago as an EI instructor answered this question with “EI is not hugs, high-fives, or handshakes!” In a recent article, renowned EI researcher Daniel Goleman stated that even after 25 years since his groundbreaking book *Emotional Intelligence* (1995) was published, people still get it wrong about emotional intelligence, they assume that EI is about being “nice” to others. Further, Goleman insisted that “this misunderstanding could get people into trouble” and may be confused with avoiding confrontations.¹¹ Although there are multiple published EI models with various components, this article will focus on the Goleman model,¹² which is widely accepted internationally, garnering most of the available empirical research today.

Emotional Intelligence (EI) often referred to as EQ (emotional quotient) by many EI researchers made a huge impact in 1995 when Daniel Goleman made the argument that EI was more important than IQ when predicting job performance. One finding posited that those with the highest level of intelligence (IQ) outperformed those with average IQ just 20% of the time, while workers with average IQ outperformed those with higher IQs 70% of the time.¹³ This finding devastated many researchers at this time who had based performance success strictly on IQ levels. What makes one person more successful than another is a combination of how that person learns (IQ), who that person is (personality), and how they handle themselves and interact with others (EI) within organizations and socially.¹⁴

Emotional Intelligence is our ability to recognize and interpret emotions within ourselves and others while using this understanding to manage our behavior and relationships with others.¹⁵ The Goleman model (see fig. 1) utilizes four domains or skills which fall under two components (personal and social).

Under the personal side, the first domain is Self-Awareness where each of us practices self-reflection or introspection to maintain honesty with ourselves about our emotional strengths and blind spots. Self-Management is the second domain under the personal side which describes how we manage or own personal choices. On the social level, our first domain is Social Awareness, or our self-reflection of our social behaviors. The final domain under the social area is Relationship Management, which is where we manage our behaviors with others.¹⁶




Figure 1 – Emotional Intelligence Domains (Skills).¹⁷

Self Awareness

This personal EI domain describes our ability to recognize our strengths and weaknesses, particularly as they relate to our emotions, values, and motives. Our values guide us toward certain emotional preferences, the strength of these emotions determines the direction of the decision which takes place in the prefrontal areas of our brain. The emotional feeling from the amygdala determines the motivational strength toward certain goals or preferences over others.¹⁸ What drives you to make certain decisions? How do your values affect your decisions or actions?

Do you make emotional decisions? Do you know what pushes your buttons? What are your triggers? Having this type of deliberate self-awareness may prevent you from exploding in a meeting or at an important dinner party.

Think of a time when you were emotionally hijacked that led to an embarrassing reaction. We all have had a similar experience and usually have the same thought ... I wish I had reacted differently!

Bradberry and Greaves (2009) recommend 15 self-awareness strategies¹⁹ to raise your emotional intelligence scores, refer to appendix A for the complete list. My top three strategies from this list are:

- Know who and what pushes your buttons²⁰
- Visit your values²¹
- Seek feedback²²

Knowing who and what pushes your buttons allows you to assess each trigger and reflect on how this person or situation made you feel. Have you ever had a relative or friend set you off emotionally? What could you do to prevent this next time? Make a list of your triggers and describe what emotions are typically associated with them.²³ This list could help you become more deliberate about your next interaction with this hot person or situation. Visiting your values reinforces your core beliefs and keeps you on the path of inner harmony.²⁴ Have you ever made a decision that made you feel uneasy or kept you up at night?

We are human and therefore make mistakes in life and usually know when we are making a bad decision. A young Air Force officer in a leadership class asked for any tool to help him make difficult decisions. I suggested that before he made any tough choices to ask himself if his decision is the right thing to do? Reinforcing our core beliefs helps guide us to do the right thing. Seeking feedback from your trusted circle of family, friends, and colleagues gives you an objective viewpoint that may shed light on an issue that was invisible to you.²⁵ The important point here is to accept whatever feedback comes your way, say thank you, and make an adjustment. This is not the time to debate your trusted confidant's assessment.

Self-Management

This personal EI skill builds on what you have learned during your self-awareness domain and is the focused drive that allows you to meet your goals and ensure positive behaviors.

Understanding your feelings allows the management of these feelings, especially negative emotions like anger, anxiety, and frustration.²⁶ If you created a trigger list, you will be prepared the next time a certain coworker pushes your buttons in a meeting and more importantly, put you in a better position to prevent an emotional hijack.²⁷ One technique that is useful in this domain is self-talk. Although some may think talking to yourself is a bit strange, it is another tool to help you revisit your core beliefs and values. Self-talk can help you stay focused as well, especially if confronted with one of your triggers.²⁸

There are 17 recommended strategies to raise your EI level in this domain, see appendix B for the full list. My preferred three strategies from this list are:

- Count to ten³⁰
- Sleep on it³¹
- Clean up your sleep hygiene³²

Counting to ten enables us to pause and take a breath during a stressful situation or when we are confronted with a crisis. This process forces you to use your rational side of your brain (prefrontal) and not allow your emotional side (limbic system) to take over your actions (hijack).³³ While working as a faculty member on the “academic circle” at Maxwell AFB, Alabama for over 14 years, I was known to take an occasional walk on the circle when I needed to reset.

The outer circle is approximately one mile, and the inner circle is a half-mile, I always wondered if this was by design! My favorite strategy for this domain is to sleep on it, especially when faced with an emotional decision at the end of the workday. I think we all have experienced what happens when we let our emotional side override our rational side; disaster!³⁴ Speaking of sleep, it is imperative that we are deliberate about our sleep hygiene. The key here is recharging your brain and body each day to promote physiological health. How can you manage your emotions each day with little to no sleep? Self-management requires alertness, so ensure that you get the recommended number of hours of sleep to recharge and repair yourself.³⁵ How would you like to work for a leader that operated on three hours of sleep each night?



If you created a trigger list, you will be prepared the next time a certain coworker pushes your buttons in a meeting and more importantly, put you in a better position to prevent an emotional hijack.

Social Awareness

In this social EI domain, you build on your personal domain skills. This area is similar to the self-awareness domain, except you want to focus on the emotions of others as you interact. What are they thinking? How did they take that last comment? What are they feeling? In other words, *empathy* is critical to this domain. To *empathize* is to utilize your amygdala neurons to read the facial expressions, gestures, and body language of others as they respond to your words and actions.³⁶ Is she upset because of what I said? Did he take it the wrong way? Why is she crying? Why is he angry? The ability to feel what another feels is the goal of empathy, this is sometimes difficult and underscores the importance of observing body language for external clues.

Additionally, empathy builds on your self-management, which means expressing emotions, as appropriate; not withholding. A leader with high EI may be moved to tears as a follower is weeping in pain over the loss of a family member, this is authentic empathy.³⁷

Bradberry and Greaves (2009), suggests 17 social awareness strategies³⁸ to increase your EI awareness, refer to appendix C for the complete list. My top three picks are:

- Watch body language³⁹
- Practice the art of listening⁴⁰
- Step into their shoes⁴¹

Watching someone's body language can provide multiple clues to their internal thought process or emotions. Lawyers use body language experts in the courtroom regularly. Professional poker players master this skill for high-dollar games every day. One's posture, eye movements, facial expressions, and hand gestures provide an abundance of information and can help determine one's mood or emotions. The art of active listening⁴² is more difficult than most of us realize.

I typically challenge my students to attempt using 100% of their active listening skills in a 24-hour period, they often report many struggles competing with multiple obstacles to achieve this challenge. Try turning off your TV, muting your cell phone, or closing your tablet or laptop during a conversation with someone; they will appreciate your presence.⁴³ Stepping into someone's shoes⁴⁴ requires practicing the empathic skills described previously. This skill works together with active listening; you must be present, attentive, and alert to situations that require empathy. If "Jim" is having difficulty expressing his concerns for his new responsibilities, put yourself in his line of thinking, not yours.

Remember to disregard your tendencies and try to imagine what Jim is feeling at this moment in time.⁴⁴

Relationship Management

This final social EI domain would be difficult to achieve without fully understanding the personal domains. How can you manage relationships with others if you struggle in managing your own behaviors? This domain includes some of the most visible tools for leaders – persuasion, conflict management, and collaboration to name a few. As a leader, how do you handle the emotions of others? First, you must be in tune with your own emotions, show empathy, and comprehend the emotions of those you lead. Remember, any disingenuous cues from a leader at this stage would diminish trust; authenticity is key.

Have you ever experienced fake emotions from anyone? How you respond to others' emotions defines your EI awareness. For instance, while you ordered your lunch at a drive-through burger joint, the attendant was very rude to you, how do you respond? While ending your workday, one of your subordinates appeared at your office visibly upset, what do you say? While entering the highway ramp recently, a trucker cut your vehicle off at high speed, how do you respond? We all have our triggers as described earlier, but your emotional response could alter your relationship, your career, or your life forever.

There are 17 strategies to increase your EI awareness in this domain,⁴⁵ see appendix D for the entire list. My top three preferences are:

- Build trust⁴⁶
- Acknowledge the other person's feelings⁴⁷
- When you care, show it⁴⁸

Building trust does not happen overnight, it takes time. Patience and consistency are keys to building trust with others. Leveraging your personal domain skills will forge your relationships as you share your emotions with others while managing their trust as well. One technique to speed up trust development would be to use your self-management skills to ask what it would take to build trust in a particular relationship. This act would demonstrate a leader’s commitment to the relationship.⁴⁹ Acknowledging the feelings of others also increases the level of trust within relationships.



Further, applying your social-awareness acumen such as listening intently and observing body language to garner emotional cues strengthens your connections with others.

Further, applying your social-awareness acumen such as listening intently and observing body language to garner emotional cues strengthens your connections with others.⁵⁰ Showing that you care is another critical strategy to demonstrate your genuine leadership while building trust and meaningful bonds. I once had an arduous work schedule to meet organizational milestones and was feeling overworked and underpaid, until I received a handwritten note and a Starbucks coffee waiting on my desk early one morning.

The note was barely one sentence, it said “Thank you for your extra dedication this week,” signed by my supervisor. The note was the highlight of my week and made me feel not only appreciated but valued as a team member. When was the last time you showed a coworker or subordinate that you cared? *Gratitude* is the easiest way to start showing that you care, and it costs you just a few seconds of your life.⁵¹

Emotional Intelligence Competencies

Within each of the four EI Domains are 12 associated EI Competencies (Table 1) or learned capabilities that allow leaders or followers to develop balance across the domains while increasing EI levels personally, professionally, and socially. A brief discussion of each of the competencies follows, with emphasis placed on those that are most impactful (asterisks) in a toxic work environment or when coping with toxic behaviors.

Self-Awareness	Self-Management	Social Awareness	Relationship Management
	Emotional Self-Control*		Influence
Emotional Self-Awareness	Adaptability	Empathy*	Coach & Mentor
	Achievement Orientation		Conflict Management*
	Positive Outlook	Organizational Awareness	Teamwork
			Inspirational Leadership

Table 1 – Emotional Intelligence Competencies⁵²

Emotional Self-Awareness

Emotional Self-Awareness is the least visible of the Emotional Intelligence Competencies and has a profound impact on your relationship with others. Amazingly, those with strengths in Emotional Self-Awareness typically demonstrate ten or more of the twelve competencies. Emotional Self-Awareness begins with introspection or self-reflection. What emotional strengths do you have? Where are your blind spots? Self-talk is very useful for this competency as described in the Self-Management domain earlier. Consider what could you do differently?

What strengths do you have in this competency to protect against toxic behaviors? How do you handle bullies? Do you let them push your buttons emotionally? Are you passive? Confrontational? Self-talk can help you find your strengths and weak boundaries.

The most important step is feedback from others. Hopefully, you have a trusted emotional support team. Sometimes we all need help finding our way in the dark; trust your support members.⁵³

Emotional Self-Control

Can you keep your emotions in check? Emotional Self-Control, in the self-management domain, is the ability to keep your emotional impulses under control. Suppressing your emotions is not the answer, *control* would be a better verb to describe the goal here. Recall the outcome of the last emotional decision that made you feel stressed? Managing your impulses and emotions and utilizing many of those self-management strategies described earlier will ground your decision-making abilities.

Emotional hijacks are very real events occurring every minute around the globe, just watch the news or read the headlines. Developing a high EI awareness level prevents us from having our emotions hijacked, which often leads to trouble. Our self-awareness skills act as an early warning system for us. In reflecting on emotional triggers earlier, we learned what provokes our hot-button issues and how it makes us feel. We also learned about coping mechanisms to lower our blood pressure and get us back to our happy place. Use these skills to keep you emotionally and physiologically healthy. Stress can have a huge impact on your health; know your body's signals.⁵⁴

In a recent character study of Air Force officers, one finding indicated that self-control was manifested primarily through the officers' display of intellectual stimulation behaviors.

Intellectual stimulation, a component of transformational leadership, allowed the officers to question underlying assumptions about how they felt, thought, reacted, and more importantly, how they were predisposed to act to various military experiences. Further, these events displayed the officers' self-control manifested through intellectual stimulation which supported rationality and awareness of emotional influence. This self-awareness can bolster future regulation of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.⁵⁵

Adaptability

The Adaptability Competency relies on flexibility in handling any kind of change in life. Being able to handle multiple issues, while accepting new situations with fresh ideas and innovation describes the power of this competency. Adaptability means never losing focus on your goals and adjusting smoothly. Adaptable leaders welcome new challenges and usually expect the unexpected. Take a minute to reflect if you have ever known an adaptable leader. Have you ever known someone who was not adaptable? What did you learn from this reflection? Adaptability is at the heart of being able to innovate and adapt in any environment.⁵⁶

Achievement Orientation

When we are strong in the Achievement Orientation Competency, our energy is focused on meeting or exceeding some standard or milestone. We are continually in pursuit of excellence. We are constantly setting challenging goals and often take calculated risks. The Achievement Orientation Competency affects all of those around you, be they followers, peers, or superiors. Metrics drive your day and your career. A word of caution – speeding continuously in overdrive could make *you* a toxic leader.

Something must give when your life becomes one big list of work tasks and goals, often referred to as burnout. Have you ever witnessed someone reaching this point? It never ends well; divorce, emergency room, assault charge, or worse. Work-life balance is the key. Learn to go home at a decent hour and continue your work during normal duty hours, occasional overtime is acceptable. Family time, health, and fitness are what keep you alive.⁵⁷

Positive Outlook

Positive Outlook is the ability to appreciate the positive characteristics in people, situations, and events around us. These positive types persist in pursuing their goals and dreams, regardless of minor obstacles or failures. A person with a positive outlook can find the plus side in any event and opportunities where others are blind. The glass is always half-full for those that enjoy this competency, and they always expect the best from others, often helping them attain their hopes and dreams. This doesn't mean that they never see the negative side of life, but they certainly are not looking for it as they energize those around them.⁵⁸

Empathy

Empathy describes the ability to sense how others feel while comprehending their perspectives. Empathic leaders are in tune with their followers, they understand their unspoken emotions. Further, active listening is an invaluable skill to enhance this competency while considering body language, eye contact, energy levels, and even nonverbal communication indicators of emotion. Empathic leaders typically connect with people from many backgrounds and cultures and convey their ideas effectively. What drives the Empathy Competency? Why is it critical that you understand how someone feels or thinks?

Consider the follower struggling with a toxic relationship at work, very stressful. Learning to accept that some people have internal character issues that lead them to negative behaviors while understanding through self-management that *they* are not the problem is a huge breakthrough. Next, using the power of empathic understanding becomes liberating for a toxic victim. The main objective for this competency is to try to understand what others are feeling before you judge their behaviors. Most importantly – ask them.⁵⁹

Organizational Awareness

As an Emotional Intelligence Competency, Organizational Awareness refers to the ability to recognize “influencers, networks, and dynamics” within the organization. Leaders are typically adept at networking opportunities and understanding power relationships. Effective leaders understand the key players within organizations along with guiding principles and culture. Those skilled in the area of Organizational Awareness can sense shifts in climate and culture. A critical step for leveraging this competency is an understanding of our own emotional levels (Emotional Self-Awareness) while examining these cues in others (Empathy). Further, we must monitor our behavior (Emotional Self-Control) for the good of the organization.⁶⁰

Influence

Leaders who embrace emotional self-awareness and self-control to manage themselves while being adaptable, positive, and empathic can articulate their visions in a way that will appeal to the masses. Influence is necessary for any leadership style and can be done in a way that is motivational and inspiring. Leaders competent in influence will garner support from others without even trying, they are very confident leaders and their followers typically shower them with loyalty.

During my days as a Naval officer, I reported aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson for my first sea tour. A few weeks later while in port, an announcement came across the intercom for all hands to report to the flight deck for words from the commanding officer. This was my first look at Capt John S. Payne, our “Skipper” with over 3,000 sailors gathered around his podium. All I remember was that he was tall, confident, and smiling as he dressed down the crew for their last liberty shenanigans and seamlessly praised them for their dedicated excellence on their last deployment. I was in awe. I looked around at the thousands of sailors ... they adored this man as they hung on every word and laughed at every corny joke! He was beloved and I was saddened that he was being transferred in a few weeks and I didn't even know him – that's influence.⁶¹

Coach and Mentor

Do you know the difference between a coach and a mentor? In the military setting, we have been conditioned to assume the mentor role, typically sharing our experiences to help our members *find* solutions to their problems. In the coaching arena, coaches are trained to *guide* their clients through carefully structured conversations, discovering their solutions. I was proud to be part of the Leadership Development Course at Air University where we taught future Air Force commanders these coaching skills using the industry gold standard, the GROW model.⁶²

The Coach and Mentor competency ensures that all our members thrive. Combining the skills of Emotional Self-Awareness, Achievement Orientation, and Empathy provides a foundation for this invaluable competency. Further, this competency fosters the long-term development of others, providing continual feedback and support. One misperception of coaching and mentoring is that its end goal relates to the needs of the organization, not the individual.

As leaders, we must remain deliberate about the individual needs of our members.⁶³

Conflict Management

Managing conflict is a core competency for leaders at all levels, in every type of organization. Conflict occurs in team settings, between individuals, within organizations, and often between units. This specific competency exercises several of the other EI Competencies, including Emotional Self-Awareness, Emotional Self-Control, Empathy, and Organizational Awareness. The Conflict Management Competency allows leaders to help others through emotional situations, tactfully bringing disagreements into the open, and defining solutions that everyone can endorse. Also, this competency can be leveraged by followers when working in toxic environments. Leaders create harmony when they make time to understand different perspectives and work toward finding a common ground.

Acknowledgment of conflicting ideas and differing views garners positive synergy toward shared goals. Conflict is a difference between two or more persons or groups where we find “tension, emotionality, and disagreement” and when bonding is lacking or broken. Bonding refers to an emotional connection, even with someone you strongly dislike. This type of relationship seeks to understand the needs of others while maintaining the relationship regardless of differences.⁶⁴

Another relevant finding in the previous Air Force character study highlighted in this competency considered transformational leadership qualities that led to social intelligence acumen. These qualities inspired thoughtful engagement as opposed to aggravated conflict. Leveraging higher levels of social intelligence allowed these officers to set aside their personal feelings for the good of the team and mission while upholding accountability for subordinates' social infractions.⁶⁵ This finding validated an earlier assertion that EI does not mean that we avoid confrontations to be "nice." Constructive conflict is essential for developmental growth.⁶⁶

Teamwork

Teamwork is the ability to work with others and achieve a shared goal and responsibility while supporting all team efforts. Effective team leaders build camaraderie, positive relationships, and team spirit. This competency focuses on not only becoming a good team member but doing your part to ensure that others feel safe to express their ideas while being included in all team decisions. Remember, inclusiveness is not just a feature of diversity. If you tend to take over, Self-Management and Self-Awareness are excellent competencies to master. Respecting emotional boundaries, establishing respect for each other, and managing conflict with care and consideration are ingredients for successful teams.⁶⁷

Inspirational Leadership

The Inspirational Leadership competency is the ability to inspire and motivate followers to accomplish organizational goals while encouraging their best efforts. Inspirational leadership can come from many different sources. Effective leaders may leverage another powerful EI competency for inspiration – influence.

Using influential skills with an inspirational approach can create a shared vision that energizes all members to achieve success. Further, those who have honed other Emotional and Social Intelligence competencies (emotional self-awareness, empathy, positive outlook, and teamwork) will enhance their versatility to engage people. Moreover, an informed leader would have a better understanding of what resonates with others and more opportunities for mutual goals.⁶⁸



Effective team leaders build camaraderie, positive relationships, and team spirit.

Conclusion

Organizational toxicity is ubiquitous, and leaders (and followers) need to be armed with competencies to help eradicate destructive behaviors from organizations. As advances in technology, social media, and a sensitive culture shift have placed the spotlight on toxic behaviors today, accountability is a social demand. No organization is indeed immune to bad or toxic behaviors, but there are resolutions. Daniel Goleman's Emotional Intelligence Domains and Competencies provide many solutions for the array of toxic behaviors that threaten organizations every day. This article examined the use of Goleman's "building blocks" for emotional intelligence to transform workplace dysfunctions, manage conflict, and increase organizational resilience and harmony.

Endnotes

Appendix A

Self-Awareness Strategies (B&G, 2009, p.63)

1. Quit Treating Your Feelings as Good or Bad
2. Observe the Ripple Effect from Your Emotions
3. Lean into Your Discomfort
4. Feel Your Emotions Physically
5. Know Who and What Pushes Your Buttons
6. Watch Yourself like a Hawk
7. Keep a Journal About Your Emotions
8. Don't Be Fooled by a Bad Mood
9. Don't Be Fooled by a Good Mood, Either
10. Stop and Ask Yourself Why You Do the Things You Do
11. Visit Your Values
12. Check Yourself
13. Spot Your Emotions in Books, Movies, and Music
14. Seek Feedback
15. Get to Know Yourself Under Stress

Appendix B

Self-Management Strategies (B&G, 2009, p.100)

1. Breathe Right
2. Create an Emotion vs. Reason List
3. Make Your Goals Public
4. Count to Ten
5. Sleep on It
6. Talk to a Skilled Self-Manager
7. Smile and Laugh More
8. Set Aside Some Time in Your Day for Problem Solving
9. Take Control of Your Self-Talk
10. Visualize Yourself Succeeding
11. Clean Up Your Sleep Hygiene
12. Focus Your Attention on Your Freedoms, Rather Than Your Limitations
13. Stay Synchronized
14. Speak to Someone Who Is Not Emotionally Invested in Your Problem
15. Learn a Valuable Lesson From Everyone You Encounter
16. Put a Mental Recharge into Your Schedule
17. Accept That Change Is Just Around the Corner

Appendix C

Social Awareness Strategies (B&G, 2009, p.138)

1. Greet People by Name
2. Watch Body Language
3. Make Timing Everything
4. Develop a Back-pocket Question
5. Don't Take Notes at Meetings
6. Plan Ahead for Social Gatherings
7. Clear Away the Clutter
8. Live in the Moment
9. Go on a 15-minute Tour
10. Watch EQ at the Movies
11. Practice the Art of Listening
12. Go People Watching
13. Understand the Rules of the Culture Game
14. Test for Accuracy
15. Step Into Their Shoes
16. Seek the Whole Picture
17. Catch the Mood of the Room

Appendix D

Relationship Management Strategies (B&G, 2009, p.179)

1. Be Open and Be Curious
 2. Enhance Your Natural Communication Style
 3. Avoid Giving Mixed Signals
 4. Remember the Little Things That Pack a Punch
 5. Take Feedback Well
 6. Build Trust
 7. Have an "Open-door" Policy
 8. Only Get Mad on Purpose
 9. Don't Avoid the Inevitable
 10. Acknowledge the Other Person's Feelings
 11. Complement the Person's Emotions or Situation
 12. When You Care, Show It
 13. Explain Your Decisions, Don't Just Make Them
 14. Make Your Feedback Direct and Constructive
 15. Align Your Intention With Your Impact
 16. Offer a "Fix-It" Statement During a Broken Conversation
 17. Tackle a Tough Conversation
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THE *Air Sigma* • MODEL OF LEADERSHIP

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Abstract

The Air Sigma Model of Leadership outlines a model of leadership built upon tactical, operational, and strategic competencies at each level of an Airmen's career. This model provides steppingstones for the development of leadership competencies at each level and can be incorporated into various educational milestones during an Airmen's career. The Air Force and other services have struggled to identify a model to identify ethical behavior, but training and education can be developed to reinforce the desired behavior at each level in an Airmen's career and this model provides an approach to develop leaders.

Ethical Leadership has become a focus in all United States military branches. High-profile incidents involving the behavior of senior military leaders, as well as scandals involving cheating by cadets, increased the need for the services to reinforce values and ethics training for all ranks. However, a testing instrument to identify those members "at-risk" does not currently exist that has a high degree of validity, and if developed, training and education would be necessary to reinforce the desired behavior at each level during the service members' career.

While leadership is easy to define and measure, such is not the case for values and ethics. However, when lapses do occur, they often rise to the forefront due to media coverage and political policy. According to AF Doctrine "Leadership is comprised of two main components: institutional competencies and leadership actions" and mentions using these components in three leadership levels (tactical, operational, strategic) based on complexity and responsibility.¹ Brown et. al. defines ethical leadership as the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships.

They further characterize followers' conduct through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making.²

While valid measuring instruments for decision-making exist, ethics remains an elusive trait when trying to predict behavior. This uncertain nature of ethical behavior leads to fundamental questions that can be addressed through education and training.

These questions include:

Why is there an ethics "crisis"? What can be done? What characteristics, attributes, and traits (CATs) make an ethical leader? Can those characteristics, attributes, and traits be measured? Are there existing assessments already available in the marketplace? Are they reliable and valid? If reliable evaluations exist, should we use these measures as "pre-employment" assessments to allow only ethical people into the military? Or OTS, or USAFA? Are these CATs teachable? Can these CATs be taught and learned? What is the optimum way to educate the force and influence positive changes in behavior?

For centuries, the concept of whether leaders were born or made was an academic question. Plato (348 B. C.) and Aristotle (322 B.C.) pondered the “virtues” effective leaders required.



However, according to Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991), traits only endow people with the potential for leadership to actualize this potential, additional factors are necessary for effective leadership.

Eventually, modern theorists developed the Trait Theory of Leadership. Leadership trait theory has been introduced, discredited, re-introduced, and modified over the past century. Even theologian St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 A.D.) reinforced the trait theory of leadership: it too lost favor in the mid-1950s.

By reviewing past and present leadership theory, the Air Force identified doctrine and values prescribed as leadership traits. Air Force leadership developed the CATs based on Air Force Core Values (AFCV), the Institutional Competencies List (ICLs), Executive Core Qualifications (ECOs) and the Desired Leadership Attributes from the Joint Forces 2020 document (JF2020). Leadership Doctrine from the LeMay Center, Profession of Arms of the United States Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard were also reviewed for relevance. The Profession of Arms and Professional Development of Leadership in the Canadian Combined Forces (CCF) were examined to find commonalities between US and Coalition views on values-based leadership.

Using corporate leadership models, Peterson and Seligman's book *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (2004)*³ provided various definitions. Craig E. Johnson's book, *Meeting the Ethical Challenges of Leadership: Casting Light or Shadow, Seventh Ed. (2019)*⁴ and *FYI: For Your Improvement, A Guide for Development and Coaching (1996- 2009)* by Michael M. Lombardo and Robert W. Eichinger⁵ provided extensive insight into the world of corporate leadership theory. However, according to Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991),⁶ traits only endow people with the potential for leadership to actualize this potential, additional factors are necessary for effective leadership.

The literature recognizes numerous leadership assessments that include values and ethics. Popular tools include Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and other studies have examined attributes including locus of control, adaptability, optimism, and destructive personality characteristics, but none of these instruments have validity. Zaccaro, Kemp, and Badar (2004)⁷ found that although any type of personality trait can reach the top levels of management, executives are more likely to prefer extroversion and intuition. Leaders who inspire by communicating a vision of a better future may come from intuition, especially intuition with feeling.

One key aspect of ethical leadership associated with social appraisal skills is self-monitoring. Zaccaro, Foti, et. al. (1991)⁸ noted self-monitoring reflects skill in monitoring social cues and controlling one's own expressive behavior, therefore; failure to do so would account for unethical behavior if it is outside socially accepted norms. What questions remain include how to mitigate lapses in behavior, and, how to strengthen the ethical behavior of Airmen currently serving? Even OPM identified lapses in behavior.

The 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey found nearly half (45%) of federal employees do not believe the leaders in their organization maintain high enough standards of honesty and integrity. One suggestion would be to use the cardinal virtues put forth by Aristotle: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. The Leadership Virtues Questionnaire (LVQ) was developed by Riggio et.al. (2010)⁹ to measure these specific virtues. The 19-item scale measures the construct of virtue-based ethical leadership. Five items measure prudence, five measure fortitude, six items assess justice and three items measure temperance. A series of studies have established the initial reliability and validity of this scale.

Findings showed that followers of moral victorious leaders feel a stronger sense of personal moral identity which infers those *moral leaders produce moral followers*. That idea can be reinforced throughout an Airmen's career through training and education. Values and Ethics are in the Air Force DNA. No research has revealed any negative effects of ethical leadership and Brown (2005)¹⁰ noted ethics occurs in a context of social learning, and education and training can reinforce correct behavior. To this end, ethical leadership can, and should be taught, reinforced, and measured by trained facilitators.

For clarity, consider a leadership model for ethical behavior illustrated below:

The Air Σ Model for Ethical Leadership

Tactical Professional Bucket		Operational Leadership Bucket		Strategic Ethics Bucket
HONESTY	+	INTEGRITY	=	LEGITIMACY
COURAGE	+	LEAD BY EXAMPLE	=	COMMITMENT
DEPENDABLE	+	PROBLEM-SOLVING	=	RESPONSIBILITY
FORTITUDE	+	MOTIVATING OTHERS	=	EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Σ of columns = a values-based leader at each level
 Σ of rows = a values-based leader at the strategic level

The Air Σ Model for Unethical Leadership

Tactical Unprofessional Bucket		Operational Lacks Leadership Bucket		Strategic Unethical Bucket
INSENSITIVE	+	MICRO-MANAGER	=	FAILURE TO BUILD TEAMS
UNTRUSTWORTHY	+	LACK OF INTEGRITY	=	BETRAYAL
SELF-CENTERED	+	ARROGANT	=	POLITICAL
MIS-STEPS VOID OF VALUES	+	AMBIGUOUS	=	POOR DECISION- MAKING

Σ of columns = unethical leadership at each level
 Σ of rows = unethical leadership at the strategic level

While these models are strictly hypothetical, these charts can be used to develop a curriculum to reinforce ethical leadership training based on the need to identify and correct unethical leadership behavior. The first step in problem-solving is identifying the problem. This model provides a basis to identify traits and build upon them at each level culminating at the sum (Sigma) of each at the strategic level when read horizontally. When read vertically, the traits also build upon each other at each level.

Therefore, at the operational level, a micro-manager who lacks integrity and is arrogant will be ambiguous in their decision-making skills, whereas an honest leader with integrity will have legitimacy when making decisions. Values, ethics, and moral decision-making can be improved through education and training and this model can provide a framework to develop a curriculum to reinforce the desired behavior at each level in an Airmen's career and this model provides an approach to develop leaders.



Endnotes

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Learning Negotiations FOR LEADERS

WHY MORE REALISTIC, COMMAND-CONTEXT PRACTICE IS NEEDED BEFORE COMMAND

DR. JOHN M. HINCK, JUSTIN A. LONGMIRE

Abstract

This article first presents the argument that military leaders do not practice enough negotiation skills before taking command. Then, using data collected from participants in seven iterations of the United States Air Force (USAF) Leader Development Course for Squadron Command (LDC) at Air University (AU), this article examines and justifies why more realistic, command-context practice is needed before and during command.

Based on analysis of data from end-of-course surveys (n=279), post-course surveys (n=79), and in-formal, follow-up interviews (n=20), respondents believed negotiation was a valuable skill but did not feel they had mastery over the skill as there was a gap between knowledge and application. Eighty percent of course graduates and all LDC Instructors (who are graduated Squadron Commanders) reported that negotiation was employed frequently in their role as commanders, but they needed more focused application in command-related contexts.

Based on the triangulation of findings from the surveys, interviews, and literature, there is empirical evidence that military leaders require more realistic practice in learning the art of negotiations before applying in command. The five recommendations from this study are: the LDC should 1) frame negotiations as part of leader development, 2) develop more realistic applications of command-specific contexts using simulations, 3) show a greater relevance to command-specific situations, 4) include simulations on "power-over" vs. "power-with" within the Trust, Information, Power, and Options (TIPO) Analysis Framework, and 5) include relevant case examples that situate negotiations at the tactical level of command as discussed in the literature review.

The art of negotiation is generally framed as a strategic leadership skill for managing conflict at senior levels of leadership at the joint, inter-agency, and cross-culturally in a deployed or operational environment. Largely, the focus is on getting to a "Yes" using an interest-based, rational-choice, or power over model that favors one side over the other. Military leaders in both deployed and garrison environments are now making more strategic-level decisions before they reach senior levels of command.

Yet, there is little guidance and even less practice on how a military leader should apply the skills of negotiation at the tactical level or in everyday command situations, and this imbalance is pertinent for two reasons. First, much of a military leaders' career is spent in garrison or a non-deployed environment and few reach the higher senior levels of command. Whether a leader is a squadron commander or higher-level commander (e.g. group, wing, etc.), there are more demands for negotiation skills that may not rise to the strategic level.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, as local, and national scenarios continue to evolve and change, so must the teaching approaches used to train military personnel. Our military leaders require more realistic practice in learning the art of negotiations before applying in command. The learning and practice must go beyond just 'what' they're learning and address 'how' they're learning.

Military leaders are introduced to the art of negotiations during the Leader Development Course for Squadron Command (LDC) at Air University. It is important to understand specifically how leadership courses for military leaders can teach, train, and practice negotiations more effectively so that leaders are prepared for negotiation challenges faced in squadron command.



Our military leaders require more realistic practice in learning the art of negotiations before applying in command.

This article serves as an effective tool for audiences to consider and reflect upon their instructional practices and by providing lessons learned, suggests program improvements in the teaching and learning of negotiations for leaders. Thus, this article is engaging with practical and pedagogical approaches relative across a broad spectrum of military schools. The repercussions of not learning and not practicing negotiations at the tactical level and in a power-with approach are pressing. Leaders would be more prepared with already-practiced valuable skills that could make a difference.

Making a difference early could prevent local situations from escalating beyond one's control, e.g., during increasing engagements with local communities over education, civil-military relations, and partnerships where power is shared or in the moment of domestic crises that seem to be growing in frequency and intensity where nuances of negotiations would matter. If handled poorly, these situations rapidly rise to national or international levels, deepen divides, and diminish the high regard that the populace has for our military.

More scholarship is needed

Negotiations have been studied extensively in the contexts of business, law, and organizations. Business, law, organizational development, and personnel management programs at nearly every civilian institution incorporate elements of negotiations as a key component of learning bargaining and labor relations. Yet, while the larger scholarly field is replete with research involving negotiations, there is less in the literature when the search is focused on the nexus of negotiations and military concepts such as leadership, leader development, and command. The limited number of sources is even more pronounced when examining military activities of negotiations outside of armed conflict.

Military leaders need negotiations for mission success whether deployed or in garrison. Yet, "military negotiation has not been treated as an area of significant research and training, for instance, as compared to business negotiation."¹ While negotiations are part of some military education programs, the focus is on the strategic level.² Even more alarming is the fact that "Military negotiation is understudied and undertheorized" particularly at the tactical level,³ and even then, it's often approached merely as a bargaining activity.⁴

Consequently, the literature review for this study focused on the body of work that related to how negotiations are understood and framed via Department of Defense policy, Air Force policy and guidance, training and development, and from the larger scholarly field in how negotiation was learned and used in the contexts of leadership, leader development, and command.

US Military Guidance

Seven prominent sources inform Air Force negotiation policy and guidance that include public law acts, Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction, joint publications, Air Force Policy Directive, Air Force Instruction, compendium, and practical guide.⁵ Generally, negotiation is framed as a strategic leadership skill for managing conflict or getting to a “yes” at senior levels of leadership at the joint, inter-agency, and cross-culturally in a deployed or operational environment. Today’s military leaders are making more strategic-level decisions before they reach senior levels of command. These leaders are increasingly finding themselves in non-kinetic (non-combat) situations that require more influence and persuasion than coercive skills, and in leadership contexts that demand increased responsibility despite limited authority.⁷

The official publications, white papers, and scholarly articles advocate for specific models, debate the best negotiation strategies, and recommend best practices. Yet, there is little guidance on how a military leader should apply the skills of negotiation at the tactical level or in everyday command situations.⁸

Negotiations Training and Education in the Military

There are seven main DoD providers of training and education related to negotiations and conflict resolution: 1) milUniversity (DoD online education and collaboration site for negotiations and dispute resolution (NDR), 2) SkillPort Air Force eLearning site (Air Force eLearning site), 3) the Air Force Negotiation Center (AFNC) (NDR training and education partner at Maxwell AFB), 4) the Air Force Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Program, 5) DoD Education Activity (DODEA) Center for Early Dispute Resolution, 6) the U.S. Military Academy’s Negotiation Project (West Point Negotiation Project (WPNP) and courses like Negotiations for Leaders), and 7) the Ira C. Eaker Center for Professional Development (home of the Air Force in-residence Mediation Courses).⁹ At Air University (AU), negotiation courses and specific skills are taught at the Community College of the Air Force (CCAF), the eSchool, Air War College (AWC), and Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Most of the courses start from a foundation of negotiations to gain power over others (“power over” vs “power with”). The concept of power with or shared authority is a concept studied by Mary Parker Follett in the 1920s.¹⁰ Follett advocated for a “power-with” approach over a “power-over” approach where power is seen as shared vs. coercive.

Power with” instead of “power over” another person. We should learn to distinguish between different kinds of power...It seems to me that whereas power usually means power-over, the power of some person or group over some other person or group, it is possible to develop the conception of power-with, a jointly developed power, a co-active, not a coercive power...I do not think the management should have power over the workmen, or the workmen over the management.¹¹

The recent scholarship seeks a more comprehensive approach to negotiation training and education that focuses on a values-based vs. a power-based approach that is more transformative, particularly relationships and outcomes, rather than distributive in nature.¹² This tactic has shown great benefits in common workplace environments, such as those commanders might find themselves in during a peacetime or in-garrison command tour.¹³

The dichotomy of power-over and power-with most closely resembles the concepts of how power is used in negotiations, particularly in differing between transformational negotiations and bargaining-type negotiations.¹⁴ If a values approach is used, then power seems to go beyond the one with assumed authority or positional power and becomes a shared exchange of authority. Instead of power-over, participants in the negotiations process move into a “power-with” phenomenon where the space for transformational negotiations becomes more important.¹⁵ And, in this new, shared role of power in a values-based approach the relational dynamics ascend and open the pathway for transformation vs. transaction.

The shared outcomes benefit the entire system of relationships. The voices of *both or all* participants matter. Hence, it is conceivable to conclude that the influence, or leadership, displayed by the military commander is transformative in nature regardless of cultural barriers and, during a crisis, the person becomes a meta-leader capable of seeing the situation and dynamics at play in a more holistic way.¹⁶ The Trust, Information, Power, and Options (TIPO) framework supports these assertions of power being used in a transformative way that benefits multiple participants.¹⁷ All too often power is used in a less than transformative and more coercive manner.

Recent research on training and education provides a foundation for mastering negotiation skills, conflict transformation, applying classroom negotiation training during community interactions, innovations for context and culture, and focusing training programs on context-appropriate outcomes.¹⁸ Over the past decade, training and education programs have begun to view “negotiations and conflict transformation” as a leadership skill that is part of an engaging leadership style that should be used in contexts involving a combination of power, influence, and persuasion.¹⁹

Negotiations in the Context of Leadership and Command in the Military

Negotiation as a concept encompasses dispute resolution, interest-based, and needs-based approaches where power is used to win.²⁰ In the civilian spaces of organizations, negotiations are often discussed as a set of skills that involve dispute resolution or conflict management.²¹ Other views of negotiations are that of leading or influencing toward a values-based approach to transform situations where power is more of a shared concept.²² The conceptual relationship between “negotiation” and “leadership” is sometimes unclear within the military context.

While *The Airman Handbook: Air Force Handbook 1* covers dispute resolution and conflict management and includes negotiating as part of fostering collaborative relationships, there is little discussion on connecting negotiations with leadership in *Concepts for Air Force Leadership-AU-24*.²³ The singular document that most directly associates negotiations as part of a leadership style in the military is *Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership: Engage and Align for Mission Success*.²⁴ "Negotiation is further viewed as a core leadership function that informs all conflict change practices...and is fundamental to positive conflict transformation".²⁵ However, the document is clear in its focus on battlefield conditions that are more operational or strategic and excludes the more common, everyday situations faced by military leaders during garrison and peacetime operations. In general, as military terms,²⁶ strategic level addresses the "why" and "with what" and is focused on national, multinational, and theater; operational level addresses the "what" within a theater or regional area, and tactical level deals with the "how" of battles and engagements at the local level. While not conclusive, clearly there is room for more attention in the tactical arena of negotiations.

A better approach in negotiations training for military leaders could be one that simultaneously connects the tactical (how) level with the strategic (why and with what) level and offers more realistic practice in every day, non-kinetic situations. Understanding how these terminologies, and others, may become valuable points that can support the transformation of language to promote a more transformative model of negotiation training is critical for any military leader development program.

If, "Negotiation skills are the *sine qua non* of successful operations in complex, conflict-affected environments,"²⁷ particularly the use of transformational activities, then similarly, transformational negotiations could be the *sine qua non* of successful activities in common, everyday environments that are more tactical. It is not enough for a military commander to understand negotiations, the concepts must be practiced and honed at the level of expected engagement – the local and community or tactical levels. This deduction is supported by such examples which could include dealing with difficult people, resolving cultural differences, acquiring resources, leading in times of crisis, connecting subordinates to unit objectives, or Courtts' approach that transformational negotiations are best used in addressing workplace conflict.²⁸



It is not enough for a military commander to understand negotiations, the concepts must be practiced and honed at the level of expected engagement – the local and community or tactical levels.

While there are several examples and case studies for the application of negotiations in armed conflict, there are few examples of simulated exercises that situate negotiations as a leadership skill that could be practiced in everyday military life.²⁹ More cases need to reflect the propensity of negotiations at the tactical level in a garrison or non-deployed environment where power must be used with others that put values over interests in pursuit of complementary outcomes.

For military leaders and commanders at the tactical level who deal with external agencies, the community, and multiple stakeholders, the case studies that are ideal for teaching in military programs should emphasize that negotiation occurs within and across cultural spaces where winning is not the end goal.

The aim is to partner with others in a values-based, shared power approach that builds organizational and community capacity. In the context of command, building organizational capacity is a key leadership capacity.³⁰ While some resources exist and deal with Cross-cultural Negotiations,³¹ there are very few courses that teach common, non-kinetic situations that most military leaders and squadron commanders continually face. This relative dearth of in-garrison, home-station scenarios has impeded effective inclusion of negotiations in curricula of leadership courses.

Negotiation Lesson from the Leader Development Course (LDC) for Squadron Command

In LDC's in-residence (face-to-face) program, the lesson on negotiation, "Negotiation: Engaged Leadership", is a 75-minute large group lecture for all students that covers four areas: Negotiation as a Leadership Competency, Review of Interest-Based Solution Model, Individual and Organizational Trust, and Psychological/Social Barriers.³² The lesson includes: two brief exercises on influence (buying a car) and maximizing value with position and interests (negotiate the orange), and a 30-45-minute lecture. This approach reflects an interest-based approach yet undervalues the importance of trust and trust development.³³

Students generally like the exercises, yet they have indicated they do not understand how to apply what they have learned in a military context.

Four takeaways from a review of the applicable literature are 1) negotiation policy and guidance focus mainly on formal dispute resolution; 2) there is an emphasis on negotiation skills for senior and joint commanders at the strategic level;

3) there is little scholarly work that either connects negotiations as a leadership tool for commanders at the tactical level or provides examples of how to use key negotiation skills as a values-based approach with shared power in a "power-with" vs. "power-over" using the TIPO framework, and 4) the value of the negotiations lessons must be reassessed. The takeaways then form the foundation upon which to advocate for further study in providing guidance, training, and education, with examples of application in the context of the tactical level of squadron command.

Learn with realistic practice

When considering leadership development, it is critical for those teaching the art of negotiation to ask, "How should the Leader Development Course better incorporate negotiations into the curriculum to prepare students for squadron command?" The current study collected data from three questions from pre-existing end-of-course surveys and five questions from pre-existing post-course surveys of the Air Force Squadron Officer School's Leadership Development Course. Qualitative data was gained through informal interviews using six questions that were conducted with 14 students from six different cohorts that spanned ten months and with six instructors who taught across the different cohorts.

Interestingly, the negotiation lesson was ranked 15 out of 25 topics by respondents who were asked to rank order the most effective topics of instruction during their LDC instruction. The qualitative comments ranged from relating to the value of negotiations, the instructor's teaching method, and the application exercise that included "a total waste of time", "one of the best lessons in the course", "not sure how I would apply this in my job", and "wish there were more time about the different types of negotiation and how they can be applied in an actual military environment."

Respondents ranked practicing and applying what was learned relatively low, which included negotiations as one of the lessons where students got to immediately put into practice what was learned. Relating to practice, many of the qualitative comments consistently showed a desire for more realistic situations or contexts in applying course concepts. Eighty percent of the respondents wanted more realistic situations of practicing negotiations in a command environment.

Because the students were not provided with sufficient real-life examples, they were unable to imagine how they could effectively employ the art of negotiation under circumstances they encounter in their daily work lives. Rather than learning how to negotiate a car purchase, students seek to “practice more realistic situations that involve military leadership and command” and “how to negotiate with local leaders at my base or agency partners?” The 14 graduates in this study felt they did not have mastery over the skill, they were not prepared to negotiate as a commander, and they were ill-equipped to negotiate with others on behalf of their unit. The six instructors felt more strongly that negotiations were a useful element that they applied during their time as Squadron Commander.

Themes emerge

Collectively, the research produced six themes:

- 1) *Negotiation Lesson is Valuable.* Graduates and instructors believed that negotiation is a valuable skill (ranked in the top half of LDC subjects), but students need clear examples for how to apply in a command situation. (232 total respondents)
- 2) *Frame Negotiations as Part of Leader Development.* Instructors or former Squadron Commanders believed that negotiation skills were a leadership skill/tool and were employed frequently in their role, largely with external organizations/agencies vs. internal to the military organization.

Graduates did not have as strong of a belief. (201 total respondents)

3) *Low Confidence in Skills.* Students felt like they did not have mastery of the skills nor an opportunity to practice the art before putting it into action. (145 total respondents)

4) *Gap in Imagining How Negotiations Connect to Command.* Students considered negotiations as separate from key skills as a squadron commander. (112 respondents)

5) *Need for Greater Relevance to Squadron Command.* Students felt it was a challenge to imagine situations where the negotiations skills could or should be applied when compared to other leadership skills, e.g., coaching, conflict resolution, and mentoring. Instructors could reflect on their commands and see clear examples of where negotiations were used or could have been used more appropriately in dealing with outside agencies. (111 respondents)

6) *More Realistic Application in LDC.* Nearly all (92% of respondents) believed that for negotiations to be rated higher during LDC more realistic application exercises should be used that include a scenario in the final course event (Sometimes called a “capstone exercise”) and simulation-type experiences. All the instructors felt that students need a more focused application of negotiation skills, either in a follow-on seminar after the lecture or as one of the situations during a capstone scenario where the skill of negotiating could be used as the key element.

Negotiation is a valued skill

This inquiry demonstrated that negotiation is regarded as a valuable skill but mastery over the skill requires the integration between knowledge and application, which is consistent with findings by McDonald and Millen.³⁴ Ultimately, while many graduates reported that negotiation was a skill employed frequently in their role as commanders, they believed that the LDC needed more focused application in contexts related to command and greater relevance to squadron command. Additionally, as evidenced in surveys and interviews, a discussion on the timing of the lesson and level of mastery is merited. The timing should be connected to the communication lesson and taught in a manner that involves students learning the concepts of “power-over” vs. “power-with” and how to apply those concepts in a realistic command-related context.

The negotiations lesson should be revamped using a more comprehensive approach that involves either a case study, simulation, or hands-on exercise in the context of squadron command with peer feedback.³⁵ Instead of framing negotiation as part of the conflict resolution spectrum, LDC could consider framing negotiation as a leadership skill that can empower a leader or commander to mediate, influence, or persuade others and that moves from conflict resolution to conflict transformation. Additionally, the findings support an approach to negotiations as “meta-leadership” that is congruent with the other concepts taught in the course and is worth exploring as a skill to add value to multiple party’s positions and simultaneously improve relationships.³⁶

The surveys and data from this study suggest that students in all levels of leadership roles want a more contextualized delivery of negotiations content. Coutts recommends the use of highly contextualized training scenarios to help students recognize the type of negotiation that best fits specific situations in their future anticipated roles.³⁷

Accordingly, transformational negotiations with a values-based approach may be the most optimal way forward in teaching leader development for future squadron commanders.³⁸

While values-based approaches are not inherently transformational they do go beyond the transactional nature with the potentiality of being more transformational. Transformational is not seen as “either/or” but a “yes/and” approach that is more holistic in transforming the individual needs or interests and incorporates the values of participants that transcends a “power-over” approach and favors a “power-with” philosophy.³⁹

As with many academic courses, leadership development courses use a building block approach, with application and case study lessons following theoretical lessons. If the negotiations lesson is not optimally situated on the schedule, students are often challenged to apply the skills gained in the negotiations lesson when tasked many days later. Negotiation lessons should be moved to immediately precede course content where those negotiation skills are called out and practiced. Other lessons, such as those related to justice and discipline lessons and a lesson negotiating for a subordinate’s promotion

require coordinating complex decisions among multiple stakeholders. These lessons present themselves as ideal targets for negotiations practice, particularly the values-based approach to negotiations.

Equally important to students and instructors as reported during interviews is increasing confidence in skills. The use of simulations in realistic situations and relevant contexts improves participant's self-confidence and, as reported by Cathy S. Greenblat, "Teaching with Simulation Games: A Review of Claims and Evidence", also "enhances student motivation and interest in the topic, promotes cognitive or conceptual learning, improves meaningful participation and sophisticated inquiry, stimulates new student perspectives, orientations, and overall empathy toward others, enhance students' self-awareness and self-confidence, and promotes better relations between the teachers and students, and among students themselves."⁴⁰

While the LDC, like other military schools, is not empowered to change existing DOD policies on negotiations, schools can change how they teach negotiations. Students and instructors already feel that the negotiation lesson is valuable. Changing how the art of negotiations is taught might influence how the higher-level institutional policies are written. By framing negotiations as part of leader development, developing more realistic applications using simulations, and showing a greater relevance to squadron command, then emerging leaders can increase confidence in negotiation skills, close gaps in how to connect negotiations to command, and imagine using negotiations at the tactical level and in common, everyday activities that mirror what happens within the context of squadron command.

Simulations based on the Trust, Information, Power, and Options (TIPO) Analysis Framework, "power-over" vs. "power-with", and case examples should be included in classroom discussions.⁴¹ In doing so, lessons on negotiations can help transform students toward a greater understanding, appreciation, confidence, and anticipation in using negotiations skills as military leaders and commanders.

Conclusion

After analyzing data from surveys (n=358) of students, graduates, and supervisors of those graduate, along with interviews (n=20) of instructors and graduates, this study found that military leaders believed negotiation was a valuable skill but did not feel they had mastery over the skill as there exists a separation between knowledge and application. While graduates of LDC and LDC instructors reported that negotiation was a skill employed frequently in their role as commanders, they realize a more focused application in command-related contexts during training is needed.

The LDC and all schools teaching the art of negotiation to emerging leaders should make changes to their negotiation-related content, context, and timing of the training in the course. Specifically, schools should 1) frame negotiations as part of leader development, 2) develop more realistic applications of command-specific contexts using simulations, 3) show a greater relevance to command-specific situations, 4) during simulations include "power-over" vs. "power-with" concepts within the Trust, Information, Power, and Options (TIPO) Analysis Framework, and 5) include relevant case examples that situate negotiations at the tactical level of command as discussed.

Endnotes

¹ Thomas G. Matyók, *Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership: Engage and Align for Mission Success* (Air University Press, 2019), vii.

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⁴ Orly Nobel, Brian Wortinger, and Sean Hannah, *Winning the War, and the Relationships: Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations With Non-Combatants*, Interim Rept. Feb 2005-Aug 2007, 2; and Tressler, *Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment, Lessons from Iraq*, 2007, vii.

⁵ U.S. Federal Statute, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, as Amended, Pub. Law 104-320 – Statute governing Government-wide implementation of ADR; Department of Defense Instruction 5145.05, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) And Conflict Management (27 May 2016) – Instruction governing DoD-wide implementation of ADR; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (17 January 2017 Incorporating Change 1-22 October 2018); Department of the Air Force Policy Directive 51-12, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution (05 Jun 2018) – Air Force NDR Policy; U.S. Department of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 51-1201: Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Program, (2 Oct 2018), Washington, DC – Instruction governing implementation of Air Force-wide ADR policy directive; Department of the Air Force, Office of the General Counsel, *How to Manage and Mediate Workplace Disputes: Air Force Mediation Compendium*, 4th ed. (District of Columbia: Office of the General Counsel, 2012), <https://www.adr.af.mil/Portals/82/documents/Resources/AF%20Compendium-4th%20Edition.pdf?ver=2019-05-14-144417-237×tamp=1557859457466> 21 – a rich source of information for Air Force NDR Program Managers; U.S. Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence. *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*. 2nd ed. Maxwell AFB, AL, 2014 – Learn the frameworks for five essential negotiating strategies tailored to the military environment; additional resources found at: <https://www.adr.af.mil/>.

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⁹ The organizations and their respective website/link are provided: milUniversity NDR Training Site, <https://login.milsuite.mil/?goto=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.milsuite.mil%3A443%2Funiversity%2Faf-ndr-class%2F>; SkillPort Air Force eLearning Site, <https://usafprod.skillport.com/skillportfe/custom/login/usaf/signon.action>; The Air Force Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Program, <https://www.adr.af.mil/>. Air Force Negotiation Center (AFNC), <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFNC/>; DoD Education Activity (DODEA) Center for Early Dispute Resolution, <https://www.dodea.edu/Offices/CEDR/>; and the Ira C. Eaker Center for Professional Development, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Eaker-Center/>.

¹⁰P. Graham, Ed. (1995). *Mary Parker Follett – Prophet of Management: A celebration of writings from the 1920s*. Harvard Business School Press, p.103 - originally: Follett, 1925, paper presented before a Bureau of Personnel Administration conference group, and published in E.M. Fox and L. Urwick, eds., 1973, *Dynamic Administration: The collected papers of Mary Parker Follett*. London: Pitman.); (PDF) *Mary Parker Follett - An Almost Forgotten Giant who is Worth Remembering*. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299481583_Mary_Parker_Follett_-_An_Almost_Forgotten_Giant_who_is_Worth_Remembering [accessed Apr 03, 2021].; Helen D. Armstrong, "Mary P. Follett: Conflict Resolution Through Integration", *Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (2002):101-16. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23684931>

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¹⁹11. See the following three key sources: Matyók, *Military Negotiation as Meta-Leadership: Engage and Align for Mission Success*; McDonald and Millen, "The Use of Role-Playing Simulations in Negotiations Pedagogy, and the Search for a More Comprehensive Approach"; and Coutts, "Transformational Negotiation: Establishing a Novel Approach to Workplace Conflict, *Journal of Military Conflict Transformation*".

²⁰Michael R. Fowler, *Mastering Negotiation* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2017), 1-28; John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (New York: Good Books, Kindle e-version, 2014), 8.

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Conflict Management • & THE AIR FORCE LEADER

PAUL J. FIRMAN

" One of the best ways to persuade others is with your ears."

Dean Rusk

Former Secretary of State

When problem-solving processes or negotiations come to an impasse a leader may resort to using a more direct approach and/or simply tell someone what to do. This type of conflict management may be effective, at times even a necessity, but it may not be the most appropriate method to solve all issues. This article explores the concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) but focuses predominately on the mediation and facilitation process. We are not suggesting mediation/facilitation skills should be used for all dispute resolutions or conflict management; only that it's a valuable leadership tool, and when used appropriately, can help manage conflict at the lowest level.

When former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. David L. Goldfein announced his initiative to revitalize squadrons he recognized, "the squadron is the beating heart of the Air Force. We succeed or fail in our missions at the squadron-level because that is where we develop, train, and build Airmen."

This statement, taken from the Chief of Staff's Focus Area document from 2016 should remind us why managing conflict is so important. When one considers why damaging conflict develops, it often stems NOT from vindictive leaders, but possibly from leaders who are so busy trying to accomplish the mission. Under constant internal or external pressure, leaders at all levels may fail to recognize ineffective communication styles or intrinsic bias that creates a perception that people are not valued. Recent studies show almost every office conflict can be traced back to a lack of communication. The University of Navarra's IESE Business School writes for Forbes, "Good internal communications help employees feel trusted and connected to each other." So, what happens when communication falters and conflict is unresolved?


Unresolved or unmanaged conflict can damage trust, create disengaged employees, and lastly, perhaps most importantly, reduce productivity. CPP Inc.--publishers of the Myers-Briggs Assessment and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Instrument--commissioned a study on workplace conflict.

They found that U.S employees spent 2.8 hours per week dealing with conflict. This time equates to approximately 359 billion dollars in lost productivity or the equivalent of 385 million lost workdays. In addition, Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) surveys have shown less than 50% of employees who have dealt with workplace conflicts such as “claims of discrimination,” report these incidents. The survey states the reason why most people do not report is fear the incident would not be taken seriously, fear of reprisal, and/or a perceived lack of support from the Chain of Command.

A program the Air Force uses to help bridge this communication gap is called Alternative Dispute Resolution or (ADR). ADR is a term that encompasses many different means to resolve or manage conflict. The term “alternative” comes from the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1996 which states, “ADR is an alternative to litigation in the Federal courts”. This concept is critical considering the average Equal Employment complaint takes 3 – 5 years to resolve. During this waiting period, employees may suffer under the weight of unresolved conflict while leaders are walking on eggshells, concerned that a legitimate disciplinary action, directed at the party who filed a complainant, might be perceived as a reprisal. And this scenario doesn’t take into account the stress of *unreported and unmanaged* workplace conflict.

The Air Force ADR program is based on federal, DoD, and service guidelines intended to assist leadership, at all levels, with conflict management support. AFI 51-1201 *Conflict Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Workplace Disputes* states:

“Maintaining a productive work environment in which disputes are prevented or settled quickly and at the lowest possible organizational level is essential.” The Department of Defense (DoD) also recognizes the benefit of early intervention. Instruction 5145.05 *Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Conflict Management* directs: “each DoD Component to establish and implement ADR program(s) to resolve disputes at the earliest possible stage. Any conflict or dispute, regardless of subject matter, is a potential candidate for ADR.” (Para 1.2 POLICY b.)



Alternative Dispute Resolution Sample Spectrum
Air Force Mediation Compendium, How to Manage and Mediate Workplace Disputes, 4th Ed, 2012)

The above graph provides a visual example of the ADR spectrum and highlights different problem-solving processes. Beginning on the left side of the graph, each process gives participants a level of control over the resolution outcome. As you move to the right, whether by law or choice, participants start to give up some or all outcome control. For example, in litigation the parties have the least amount of control, giving up that power to a judge who has the ultimate authority to decide their outcome. Although every process has value when dealing with conflict, this article focuses on the Air Force mediation program and how these skills can be translated into an informal mediation/facilitation process.

Mediation is a formal dispute resolution process where parties retain control of the outcome while relying on a trained third-party neutral to assist with communication. In mediation, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) defines a neutral as someone who has “no official, financial, or personal (conflict of interest) with respect to the issues.” In other words, the neutral has nothing to gain or lose and is there to help the disputing parties discuss their concerns and develop their own resolution. In an official mediation, a neutral mediator serves at the will of the parties. If participants in mediation, whether perception or reality, believed the mediator was biased, pushed for a certain resolution, or favored one party over the other, trust in the mediation process would break down and become ineffective.

A trained mediator/neutral is an individual who meets specific criteria for mediating workplace disputes. Training includes complying with ethical standards such as self-determination, impartiality, confidentiality, and competence. These standards are fundamental to the success of the mediation program and have been adopted by the American Bar Association, American Arbitration Association, and the Association for Conflict Resolution. The primary goal of these standards is to guide the conduct of mediators, protect the mediating parties, and promote public confidence in mediation as a process for managing and resolving disputes.

A military leader may use the concepts of mediation to manage or resolve a dispute, but they are never truly neutral when dealing with conflict in their organization. Execution of authority (although appropriate for a military leader) would violate the standards of conduct a mediator must protect. For example, mediators avoid conflicts of interest at all costs, but a military leader will never be able to avoid conflicts of interest, nor should they.

These interests include the commander’s intent, maintaining good order and discipline, and when appropriate, ensuring orders or directions are followed. For that reason, we will transition from formal mediation to the role of a **facilitator**.

“

A military leader may use the concepts of mediation to manage or resolve a dispute, but they are never truly neutral when dealing with conflict in their organization.

A trained facilitator (in an organization) may have similar mediation skills, but understand the complexity [of], and how to manage inherent conflicts of interest. They can serve at the will of the parties, to the extent of being neutral to the issues in controversy. A facilitator can help the oppositional parties open lines of communication, understand each other’s positions, but more importantly help them recognize underlying interests. Often, problem-solving from a positional basis (what someone wants) can lead to one party or the other using legitimate or even illegitimate power in an attempt to resolve the conflict in their favor. A skilled facilitator can assist with communication, help the parties recognize biases, see blind spots, and communicate openly. In essence, the facilitator helps the parties use negotiation, or interest-based skills to manage their conflict.

Interest-based problem-solving techniques are characterized by understanding why a person wants what they want. A facilitator does not ignore positions but helps the parties dig deeper by asking a series of critical thinking questions. These questions encourage an open exchange of information as the facilitator guides the parties towards a mutually beneficial resolution. Facilitators serve as a **buffer**, ensuring both parties are heard, respected, and not judged as wrong or right.




FIGURE 2 (AIR FORCE MEDIATION COMPENDIUM, 4TH ED, 2012)

Trained facilitators share a mediator's defined process. (See Figure 2) They help the parties discuss what happened in the past, but then move the discussion to a focus on the future. The facilitator typically opens the session by setting clear ground rules that include mutual respect (no interruptions) and explains the process from beginning to end. Most facilitators encourage the parties to explain their views about the problem and have them explore ideas to best resolve the issue. As the facilitator maintains process control, a psychological movement unfolds... the parties shift from anxiety, fear, and/or distrust, to mutual trust in the process. This change takes time, but as the parties start to understand underlying biases and sense someone is listening, tensions often ease, and the parties are usually willing to reveal their concerns and discuss issues. With coaching from the facilitator, the parties typically begin to communicate with each other, in what is called a joint session.

The key to this process is that facilitators **do not impose** a solution. The goal is to help the parties explore underlying issues and guide them to a solution using active asking and active listening skills. A facilitator's power lies in process control and although they may suggest a solution or provide some coaching, the parties need to know they do not have to accept the recommendation. In essence, the facilitator may not be a true neutral but can maintain neutrality to the issue at hand while protecting self-determination.

During the process the facilitator may speak with one party at a time, attempting to build trust and find common ground among the parties. This private one-on-one session is called a caucus and is used to allow more direct questioning. The same direct questions in a joint session could inadvertently give the perception of favoritism. In a caucus, the facilitator often begins to learn about underlying interests. Then, typically encourages the parties to come back together in a joint session to discuss the issues, often resulting in moving toward resolution.

Facilitation skills have value for military leaders. Knowing when and how to apply these skills is the challenge. Consider how these skills could improve your ability to facilitate a dispute between two or more of your subordinates or co-workers. For example, when two people, with your support, work together to come up with a solution, the solution often has a better chance of succeeding because it's *their* solution, not one that has been imposed on them. This process is not easy, but with training and practice, leaders can gain another tool to manage conflict and reduce workplace hostilities.

Understandably, mediation/facilitation is not the answer to all military disputes. Obviously, there are appropriate times to use your authority to accomplish your will as a leader. But consider how continual use of this power approach of forcing your will, could negatively impact mission accomplishment.

Managing conflict by simply telling someone what to do may work in some situations, but other circumstances may require additional tools to help manage conflict at the lowest level.

The goal of this article is to share the value of learning and implementing mediation and facilitation skills in the workplace and to help leaders know when to reach out and understand what to expect from a well-trained mediator. One of the greatest leadership traits is to know when outside support is necessary and how that support could benefit individuals and ultimately the organization. When appropriate, a trained mediator can assist any organization to resolve or manage conflict. Mediation may also bring some comfort to a commander knowing that a mediator is bound to confidentiality.

Finally, consider a role as a facilitator in your organization. With so much organizational conflict stemming from poor communication and employees feeling unheard, an individual with appropriate training could make a difference. Early intervention could dramatically improve communication and improve employee performance.

NOTE: You can learn more about the Air Force ADR program by contacting the Air Force Negotiation Center. (<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFNC/>) You may never serve as a neutral, but understanding the value of a trained mediator can help you and your organization be more comfortable with, and know when to ask for outside support.

Endnotes

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Changing an Adversary's Behavior

• A FRAMEWORK FOR • EXPLOITING THE HUMAN DOMAIN OF WARFARE

JAMES "TRACE" HAYWARD, LT COL, USAF

ABSTRACT

*The human domain is not an officially recognized warfighting domain by the DoD, but it is a part of every operation that takes place within the United States Government (USG). Every action and every statement made by the USG aims to affect a target audience. Whether the USG or the US military clearly states it, behavioral change of a target audience is often the goal they seek to achieve. It is in the best interest of the USG and the DoD to embrace a planning methodology that increases the likelihood of behavioral change. Currently, no such methodology exists for strategic-level planning. This proposed framework would increase the chance of changing the behavior of a target. To explore this, the research asks: under what conditions do strategic planning processes increase the likelihood of behavioral change? In response, an evaluation of the two strategic cases shows how the behavioral change took place and what factors made the change more or less likely. The first case is the Cuban Missile Crisis and the second is Operation Allied Force (OAF). Both cases resulted in the adversaries changing their behavior to conform with USG desires, but the outcomes were the result of different strategies. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides an example of US strategic **deterrence** resulting in a non-nuclear resolution to the crisis. OAF provides an example of US strategic **compellence** resulting in President Milošević halting the genocide of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.*

To similarly evaluate the two cases, I created a five-level framework to assess the thoroughness of the strategic planning and execution during the events. These levels offer a set of questions, precepts, and concepts that focus the research and findings. These five levels include 1. Understanding the observed system, 2. Defining/understanding the desired end-states, 3. Selecting strategies for behavioral change, 4. Identifying the means of executing the strategy, 5. Measures of Effectiveness, contingency planning, and iteration.

While evaluating the two case studies through these levels, it became apparent that they have the potential to increase the likelihood of behavioral change. When the levels are sub-optimally utilized by strategists, they significantly challenge the efficiency of the entire strategic planning and execution process. This article highlights the value of analyzing past events through this framework and recommends how strategists can use it in future endeavors.

On March 17, 2011, I found myself sitting in the vault in the 492nd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom. I was an instructor Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) - now referred to as a Combat Systems Officer (CSO) - in a combat-coded F-15E unit. We were called to a meeting to discuss the escalating situation in Libya. Chances were high that we were going to contribute to an air campaign to halt the atrocities that Muammar Qaddafi was inflicting on innocent civilians.

A hand went up in the crowd and asked the question, "What is our mission going to be?" The answer from our commander was, "A No-Fly Zone." Everyone in the room asked, "How does that stop a ground war?"

The question was pertinent. Sidebar conversations ramped up among the Airmen who immediately had questions. A few wondered aloud if the planners understood Qaddafi's lack of concern for civilian deaths. Do they understand a No-Fly Zone cannot stop a land war? Do they realize we have to bomb the Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) to make a No-Fly Zone even a possibility? We all wondered about the *objective*. The responsibility of flying combat aircraft is immense. Combat requires fighting forces to make split-second decisions even after hours of research and planning to execute the mission, often through simply pressing a little red button on the flight controls—establishing the roles of a jury, judge, and executioner upon warfighters. While not a strategist during this conflict, every bit of confusion and inefficiency that happened at strategic levels was felt in the cockpit of the F-15E flying in the Libyan night sky.

This was a *crisis* and there ought to be an efficient process to plan war strategies to increase the likelihood of success! The USG's participation brought military success but failed to ensure post-conflict stability in Libya. While this intervention could be called "crisis management", a holistic strategy that ensures stability after the military campaign is justified, perhaps required.

In the USG, the "crisis-to-crisis" strategy appears to be prevalent. By responding expeditiously, strategists may inherit a greater risk of mission failure. While operating on a crisis-to-crisis standard to change adversarial behavior has sometimes worked in the past, it is not the most efficient means of tackling complex problems with global ramifications. In the case of Libya, this approach did not provide stability for the Libyan people.

If behavioral change is the ultimate aim of a strategist, there ought to be a planning methodology for creating strategies that increase the likelihood of such behavioral change. This is not the case. At the time of writing, aside from methodologies taught in academic circles, there is not an officially recognized methodology for planning strategies within the United States government (USG). There are certainly none in the Department of Defense (DoD). The closest methodology would be the Joint Planning Process (JPP) specified in Joint Publication 5-0 but the gaps in its foundation leave room for failure at the strategic level of planning and execution.

It seems anathema in strategic planning to suppose there is a methodical way to build strategies. Much of the literature and conventional wisdom highlights the genius of a leader who makes the difference between employing a winning or losing strategy. The idea is that the individual, by his or her intellect and experience, will save the day. One of the many flaws with this idea is that it places the potential for success squarely on having the "right person at the right time." This idea is irresponsible for any organization, especially one where its actions have lethal and potentially global consequences.

The oft-stated worry is that a strategic planning methodology creates a checklist for strategists who then remove their responsibility for decisions, limit creativity, and ignore the contextual elements of the situation at hand. This worry is absurd. The DoD takes immense pride and care in developing strategic thinkers. These leaders are placed in positions of immense responsibility because of their ability to learn, flourish, and perform.

What follows is a proposed framework that would increase the chance of changing the behavior of a target; it is a **framework for analysis of the human domain of warfare**. The human domain is a *theoretical* battleground in the minds of the target audience. It is the critical juncture for changing an adversary's behavior. The proposed framework analysis is not the strategy itself but is a means to the end; it is context and domain agnostic and can apply to any scenario. This framework analysis can help guide planners to select an appropriate strategy with a high likelihood of achieving desirable behavioral change. Ideally, planners should execute these levels *in sequence*.



Figure 1. The Framework
(Source: Author)

OBSERVE: Gather data and conduct analysis of the system where strategic change is desired: Understanding Observed System. This first level of the framework addresses the foundational element of behavioral change. Any hope of effectively changing the behavior of an audience relies on fully *understanding the environment* in which a strategist is hoping to exert influence. It would be an error to view the operating environment solely through a limited cultural lens (i.e., Western only).

By doing so, strategists run the risk of mirror imaging bias. Strategists and leaders must be able to look at the operating environment from the other side of the coin, that of the target audience. The strategist needs to look at the current operating environment, often referred to as the observed system in other literature.

1. The observed system is not only the current state of affairs in a nation or organization but an almost visceral understanding of how that entity works. This includes the interaction of people, leaders, organizations, cultural influence, historical context, geography, and anything that would influence a decision-maker.¹

2. Any hope of effectively changing the behavior of an audience relies on a robust understanding of the environment upon which a strategist is hoping to exert influence. In military parlance, this is akin to a contested and degraded environment. While not an exhaustive list, one must understand the complex dynamics of culture, history, political composition, military strength, economic stability, social makeup, information access, infrastructure reliance, and physical environment. For the strategist, time is the ultimate constraint for enacting behavioral change.

When conflict between peoples or nations arises, these considerations cascade into how leaders, organizations, and the population (i.e., target audience) will act. These actions differ depending on how threatened the target audience judges the impending conflict. The operating environment can also appear different depending on which side of the conflict a strategist sits. The USG may see the environment one way while the target sees it another. Understanding both perspectives is critical to operations in the human domain.

There are countless ways that a strategist can become educated on the observed system. Perhaps the strategist is a country or regional expert. If not, he or she should seek that expertise from other agencies (e.g., CIA, DIA, etc.) and ensure there is a wide range of understanding. At a micro level, the strategist can take the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)² model as a basic framework for understanding. Again, the means for building an understanding of the observed system is not meant to be prescriptive. The JPP offers valuable considerations in the Mission Analysis that optimize the tactical and operational levels of warfare scaled for strategic application. The tool used to assess the operating environment needs to be methodical and as accurate as possible to enable the subsequent levels in the framework.

With a solid understanding of the observed system, strategists need to identify the decision-makers in the opposing nation to know where to direct strategic efforts. For simplicity, efforts should focus on leaders, *organizations*, or *the population*. The strategist should look to change the decisions and timelines of a leader, the support that organizations offer to leaders or the perception of the population. The complexity of changing the behavior at each level is drastically different. To maximize success, the strategist needs to understand the decision-making process within a nation and this understanding comes from the observed system.

ORIENTATION: Defining the Desired End-State.

The second level in the framework is orienting the process towards an end state. To do so, the strategist must *define the desired end-state from available national strategic guidance*. To change the behavior of the target audience, a strategist needs to know what goal he or she is working toward. It may be a defined end state at the end of hostilities, or it may be a set of conditions ripe for an enduring strategic advantage. This desired end-state can come from various locations. Often it is in the national security strategy, national military strategy, a national policy, a directive from a position of authority (e.g., the President), or a desire to change a social norm. In a crisis, defining desired end-states tends to occur as events unfold. The source of these end-states may be political leaders or combatant commanders.

The desired end-states, when properly articulated and defined, should inform political and military objectives that will set the conditions for success. When the strategist knows the desired end-state, he or she can then decide what level of risk is acceptable and assess the probability of resulting behavioral change. Building upon the observed system in the first level of the framework, the strategist can select desired end-states that have a greater likelihood of success. Finally, the strategist needs to communicate the desired end-states within the organization and must consider how political and military leaders should articulate the desired end-state to the target audience. This latter point is critical. The target *must* know what the USG desires for a reasonable chance of behavioral change. The Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) discussed later is a superb case of intraorganizational and international communication of desired end-states.

CREATE: Once the end-state is known, the strategist must begin to develop strategies for behavioral change. The third level of the framework directs the selection of an *appropriate strategy for behavioral change*. While this article only mentions coercion, deterrence, and compellence, there are countless other strategies across political and military history that provide equally effective strategies for behavioral change. The strategist needs to select an appropriate strategy based on his or her understanding of the operating environment and knowing the desired end-states. These first two levels of the framework highlight whether the strategy should seek to maintain/return to the status quo or seek a behavioral change in opposing decision-makers for a new state of the environment. The strategy defines if the threat of force is enough or if the use of actual force is necessary. Lastly, *the strategy should not be confused with the means of execution*. The two case studies below highlight effective strategies but there are countless examples of effective strategies throughout history.

ENABLE. With appropriate strategies developed, the means of execution for tactical, operational, and strategic success must be established. The fourth level of the framework is *identifying and utilizing appropriate means of execution*. This level comes down to capabilities (i.e., means) used in support of the strategy from the previous level. As previously mentioned, the danger in this level is if strategists select a means that may not be best suited for supporting the strategy simply because it is in vogue, in theater, or simply available. A better approach is to select the capabilities based on the effects desired. These effects can be from kinetic or non-kinetic means and can take direct or indirect pathways. Finally, effects can be permanent or temporary.

Kinetic effects are physical and considered “hard power.” They typically result in physical damage or destruction. Kinetic means range from a conventional weapon strike (e.g., precision-guided munitions, sea mines, rockets, missiles, etc.) to a weapon of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear). Conversely, non-kinetic effects refer to “soft power” and do not result in physical destruction. Examples include cyber capabilities/access, electromagnetic spectrum control, and exploitation, social media, traditional information operations, and actual interaction with the target audience. These means may be overt or covert action.

Finally, direct effects go straight to the target audience (i.e., the fastest and most efficient route) whereas indirect effects take a circuitous route to get there (i.e., slower, and more obscure path). Once a strategist decides upon the means of execution, they can then decide how to synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic effects across the warfighting domains, so they are all working in concert toward a common goal—the desired end-state. An ideal scenario would have a synchronized, joint, all-domain game plan to derive the behavioral change of the target audience. The strategist should have options ranging from the hammer to the keyboard and everything in between.

ANALYSIS. The final level of the framework requires the strategist to establish appropriate measures of effectiveness, contingency plans for branches, sequels, and further iterations of the strategy. Finally, the fifth level of the framework is *validating the effectiveness of the strategy, contingency planning, and iteration in planning*. For any decision-maker or strategist, there must be measures of effectiveness to validate that a plan works as intended.

If the behavior is changing, but not in the manner expected, the strategist must consider contingency plans to steer the strategy back on course. An important question to ask as the execution phase is taking place is if the strategy offers any ability to iterate the plan and adjust?

The Framework as a Lens to View the Past

First, an important disclaimer about the following two cases studies. The five levels of the framework discussed in the previous section were *not* a part of the decision-making processes at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis or Operation Allied Force. It would not be fair to fault the strategists and decision-makers for not employing a methodology that did not exist at the time of these events. The analysis centered on researching the extent to which national security decisions in the context of the framework increase the likelihood of successful behavioral change.

The selected case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Operation Allied Force (OAF) both resulted in the adversaries (Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Slobodan Milošević) changing their behavior to conform to USG desires, but the outcomes were the result of different strategies. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides an example of US strategic *deterrence* resulting in a non-nuclear resolution to the crisis. OAF provides an example of US strategic *compellence* resulting in the resignation of President Milošević. Thankfully in both cases, the outcome of the engagements benefitted the United States government's (USG) interests, and in a way, the interests of all humanity.

Over the course of 13 days in October 1962, the world held its breath as the two global superpowers—the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—stood on the precipice of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis offers a rare glimpse into strategic decision-making where failure could result in devastating consequences—global thermonuclear war. This event serves as an example of a compressed decision-making window inherent to a crisis scenario in which the leaders of the two great powers, US President John F. Kennedy, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, managed to come to a non-nuclear resolution to the crisis.

Operation Allied Force (OAF) provides a compelling counterpoint to the Cuban Missile Crisis. OAF was a 1999 air campaign launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Serbian forces that were engaged in the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population in Kosovo. OAF is compelling for this article not only because it was NATO's first war but because the outcome of the air war was not as the US and NATO expected. The USG and NATO thought that waging an air war against Milošević's military would cause him to capitulate in a matter of days. This was not the case. He held out for 78 days on the receiving end of NATO's military might. Milošević's behavior did not change until the air strategy began targeting items whose loss threatened the Serbian power base. Eventually, Slobodan Milošević would remove his forces from Kosovo and resign from his presidency. While Milošević's resignation was not the intended goal, it met the desired end-state of stopping the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanian population. Again, analyzing the decisions by US leaders and Milošević through the levels of the framework highlights critical behaviors needed to change the adversary's behavior.

Applying the Framework to Case Studies **Understanding the Observed System.**

The Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) is unique in that before the detection of the nuclear weapons in Cuba, the USG perceived that they understood the observed system.³ Only after detection did the government truly know the actual state of affairs. Thankfully, President Kennedy and his staff were familiar with the Soviet Union, how it operated, and how it perceived USG actions. This critical knowledge shaped President Kennedy's decisions which did not back Khrushchev into a diplomatic corner and limit his response options. The value in the observed system in the CMC is the ability to understand the planning and execution of a strategy with a higher likelihood of success since the USG understood its opponent. This understanding absolutely increased the likelihood of behavioral change.

Conversely, strategists and decision-makers in OAF did not have a true understanding of the observed system. They did not understand the importance that the Serbs placed on Kosovo. This critical error resulted in the misperception that Milošević would capitulate in a manner of days and not months. Furthermore, this lack of understanding hindered the strategists' ability to correctly identify what Milošević values. The lesson OAF demonstrates that misunderstanding the observed system can clearly affect other levels in the framework. In this sense, the first level should not be viewed in a stovepipe. The USG's lack of understanding of the observed system resulted in suboptimal performance in the planning room as well as the battlefield.

Defining/Understanding the Desired End-States.

During the CMC, President Kennedy took exceptional care to outline the desired end-state in unambiguous terms. A consistent, clear message contributed to changing the behavior of Khrushchev and the subsequent removal of missiles from Cuba. The USG's desired end-state allowed for a Soviet exit without further threatening Cuba or the Castro regime. In sum, an adversary must understand the demands before it will change its behavior. Absent this understanding, the adversary may respond in a manner that does not favor the desired end states. The CMC provides an excellent example of effectively defined and communicated end-states.



The value in the observed system in the CMC is the ability to understand the planning and execution of a strategy with a higher likelihood of success since the USG understood its opponent.

During OAF, the Coalition was essentially one-for-two on communicating their desired end states. The Coalition *did not* effectively communicate the desired end-state within their own military organization which led to significant challenges during the execution of OAF. The communication of desired end-states through diplomatic means to Milošević *was* effective even though he refused to sign the Rambouillet peace accords. This setback highlights a strange dichotomy where the adversary knew (and rejected) the desired end-states, but the Coalition military leaders did not. The lesson learned is that confusion at the strategic level on the desired end-states can play a critical role in the application of force in a decisive manner. This confusion hampered the selection of appropriate strategies, objectives, and targets to realize the end-states. Here again, the Coalition's lack of effective desired end-states resulted in suboptimal performance in the planning room as well as the battlefield.

Selecting Strategies for Behavioral Change.

One understanding of the events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis is that the crisis was the result of deterrence failures (i.e., the USG did not deter Soviet missile emplacement in Cuba).⁴ If the goal of deterrence is the maintenance of the status quo, the placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba is indicative of a deterrence failure. This failure required the USG to transition to a compellence strategy to *return* the world to the pre-crisis status quo. It also gives credence to Schelling's 1961 assertion that in practice the line between deterrence and compellence is often opaque. In the entirety of the Cold War, one can easily argue that general deterrence successfully avoided a nuclear war even with consideration of the close call during 13 days in 1962. During these 13 days, we can clearly see that the USG utilized a compellent strategy.

The conventional compellent threats allowed the crisis to stay at low levels of escalation while credible nuclear compellent threats offered a terrifying backstop to challenging the former. The positive lesson from the CMC is that it is best to define a strategy not based on means available but rather, by desired end-states. A correct strategy greatly increases the probability of behavioral change.

OAF is an interesting case in that it shows that *threats* of force do not always work, even when backed by the superiority of NATO forces. When it comes to selecting a specific type of compellent *action* (e.g., punishment, denial, risk, decapitation), a strategist needs to know the political and military objectives to build an effective strategy.

Even though these objectives were in question, strategists were able to select an appropriate strategy (compellence via denial/decapitation) because the objective of halting ethnic cleansing superseded any other political or military objectives. Despite the eventual success, this was not an ideal situation to plan a strategy. Notably, the initial risk strategy provided suboptimal performance in execution. It simply was not an effective strategy to stop ethnic cleansing (i.e., bombing Yugoslav tanks which were not targeting people). The Coalition eventually realized the error and transitioned to more of a decapitation strategy (i.e., counter-value targeting of Milošević's priorities). The premier lesson from OAF is the selection of strategies relative to the specific *context* for which they are to be employed and not because it is something that desired means can support. This shift in strategy ultimately increased the likelihood of behavioral change.

Identifying the Means of Executing the Strategy

During the CMC, President Kennedy effectively employed military and diplomatic means to enable a coercive strategy which eventually resulted in behavioral change. Kennedy applied indirect methods of threatening the Soviet government via a non-kinetic naval quarantine. He paired these indirect threats with unambiguous diplomatic correspondence with Khrushchev. The USG benefitted from the ability to keep planning in secret (i.e., Khrushchev was unaware the USG knew about the missiles) and posture the quarantine before Kennedy went public with the intelligence. He then relied on diplomacy to resolve the crisis. A major lesson from the CMC is that both military and diplomatic means must work in concert to increase the likelihood of behavioral change. In retrospect, the USG was able to understand the observed system, develop a desired end-state, and decide on a strategy in secret before they had to execute the means and deal with contingencies. This evolution of events highlights an ideal example of an optimal process.

During OAF, the means of supporting the strategy was through an airpower-only campaign. It is certainly a worthy debate to consider the merits of a theoretical land campaign and how that could have changed the experience, but in the end, the air-only campaign resulted in Milošević's behavioral change and capitulation. It is hard to argue with success. Although, while successful, the expectation remains to understand how the campaign could have been more effective. Case in point, the execution of the air campaign was far from optimal. The biggest problem with implementation came from the disagreements between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (General Wesley Clark) and the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (Lieutenant General Michael Short) regarding targeting priorities for meeting military objectives (e.g., tanks vs. counter-value targets).

The unfortunate outcome of targeting disagreements was potentially a prolonged campaign and therefore unnecessary losses of blood and treasure. It is possible that sub-optimal execution in the other levels of the framework exacerbated the challenges during execution. This crisis illuminates a less than ideal utilization of the methodology, in part because *planning and execution of all levels of the framework were simultaneous*. Had the strategists understood the observed system, had clear end-states, and selected the correct strategy from the start, the execution of the airpower campaign might have been smoother. Ultimately, the Coalition did effectively use airpower to support a compelling strategy that increased the likelihood of behavioral change.

Measures of Effectiveness, Contingency Planning, and Iteration

The measures of effectiveness *before* the CMC started were a failure. The USG was unaware that nuclear weapons were on Cuban soil. Simply put, the USG was not validating the effectiveness of its deterrence strategy. It was by luck and chance that the USG detected the missiles before they were fully operational. As a result of that luck, the USG quickly adjusted its strategy and appropriately established new measures of effectiveness. This sequence of events highlights the importance of accurate intelligence and the ability to validate the truth of words via the actions of the adversary. The USG stressed the iteration of the plan as new intelligence or diplomatic correspondence arrived from Moscow. During the crisis, the USG effectively recapitulated its plan and responded to contingencies very well.

During the early weeks of OAF, there was an efficient measure of effectiveness for phases one and two of the air campaign. It highlighted that the focus on the number of tanks destroyed was not a good indicator of the Armed Forces of former Yugoslavia, the *Vojaska Jugoslavije's* (VJ), atrocities, or Milošević's proximity to capitulation. Tanks were the incorrect target. It was not until targeting in phase three shifted to more of a "counter-value" approach did the campaign have a greater effect on Milošević's willingness to continue fighting. The record on handling contingencies is generally positive. In a way, the measures of effectiveness highlighted that the strategy was not working and warranted a change. As noted earlier, efforts in all the levels of the framework were simultaneously ongoing. Essentially through trial and error in targeting, planners arrived at a strategy that forced behavioral change. The lesson from this level is that when the measures of effectiveness tell you the strategy is not working, it is time to try something different. The sunk-cost fallacy is a real and tempting bias in wartime. The measures

of effectiveness, contingency planning, and iteration in OAF positively contributed to the outcome despite a frustrating and sub-optimal process.

The CMC and OAF in Comparison.

Reflecting on the two case studies, both the CMC and OAF resulted in behavioral change and ultimately a strategic win. For the CMC, the framework highlighted that meeting each level increased the likelihood of behavioral change. Each level was complementary in nature and built upon one another. It is important to note that the USG completed the first three levels of the framework in private *before* the USG made the public announcement of weapons in Cuba which set off the crisis. This fact highlights the value in allowing the process to work sequentially. Once the inflection point of public announcement was complete, the crisis went into the execution of means, measures of effectiveness, handling contingencies, and iteration. The CMC was an ideal example of optimal use of the levels of the framework.

OAF also resulted in behavioral change even though two out of five levels of the framework were sub-optimally executed. This evidence suggests that meeting every level is not required for behavioral change. The cost of suboptimal utilization of a level is challenging to quantify. As mentioned earlier, it is impossible to know if the operation could have saved "X" lives or ended "Y" days sooner were all levels of the framework better executed. While success ultimately came about in the form of Milošević stopping his genocidal behavior, the process was suboptimal for the planners and quite possibly resulted in unnecessary lives lost and resources wasted.

Evidence suggests that the proposed framework is a useful tool when viewing each level as an opportunity to *increase the likelihood of behavioral change*. It is not necessary to correctly use every level of the framework to bring about a desired behavioral change. The two case studies, and OAF highlight the importance of selecting the appropriate strategy, means of execution, and iteration (levels 3-5). These three levels seem to be the most important of the five because an effective strategy is the bedrock of behavioral change. With the correct strategy, one can select appropriate means to support that strategy, and effective iteration during execution will shore up most mistakes. It is likely that these three levels of the framework will drive success or failure in future scenarios. The remaining two levels tend to lend themselves to process optimization.

While OAF evidence shows that behavior can still change despite not perfecting each level of the framework, these levels would *further* increase the likelihood of behavioral change if implemented *sequentially*. Sequential execution would minimize the discord experienced by the strategists and decision-makers.

From the case studies examined, a framework is an appropriate analogy as each level defines the subsequent one and achievement of greater specificity as one travels through the levels. An understanding of the operating environment is the logical starting point. If the understanding is incorrect or built on incorrect assumptions, the negative effects of that understanding will cascade into the following levels of the framework, stripping strategists of the ability to set a realistic desired end-state, select appropriate strategies, etc.

The absence of this linear approach could hypothetically result in mid-crisis decision-making when planning to use a specific means (e.g., airpower) and then building a strategy around it to shoehorn in the rationale. As the adage goes, “when you only have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” Strategists can certainly do better.

The Framework for the Human Domain of Warfare

Carl von Clausewitz is famous for saying that “everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.”⁵ Truer words were never spoken. While the strategy may be both simple to understand and difficult to execute, it is possible to define what a successful strategy entails. The ultimate goal of strategy—and the true measure of success—is the ability to affect the behavior of a target advantageously. This ability is accomplished through the human domain of warfare.

The human domain is not an officially recognized warfighting domain by the DoD, but it is a part of every operation that takes place within the USG. Every action and every statement made by the USG aims to affect a target audience. Whether the USG or the US military clearly articulates it, behavioral change of a target audience is often the goal they seek to achieve. It is in the best interest of the USG and the DoD to embrace a planning methodology that could increase the likelihood of behavioral change. Currently, no such methodology exists for strategic-level planning.

This framework for the human domain is one possible methodology to achieve those desired ends. It may not be *the* solution to all the challenges of strategic planning, but it might be quite helpful all the same. It is also one more than what the DoD has now. The global human population is incredibly complex, interconnected, tense, and often unpredictable. The framework for the human domain of warfare is a clear and methodical way of planning and execution that offers a repeatable and concise methodology for planning deliberate and contingency operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Hayward is a 2006 graduate of the University of Florida, where he majored in anthropology. Upon commissioning, he began his career as a Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) in the F-15E. After initial training, he joined his first operational squadron at RAF Lakenheath, UK, in the 492d Fighter Squadron.

There he was deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya, and other contingency operations around the world.

In 2014, Lt Col Hayward attended pilot training at Sheppard AFB where he was selected for the F-16C. Upon completion of training at Kelly Field, TX, he returned to EUCOM for an operational tour at Aviano AB, Italy in the 510th Fighter Squadron. There he was responsible for employing current tactics and integrating with U.S. and NATO combat partners. Lt Col Hayward deployed to Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa with the 510th FS.

In 2019, Lt Col Hayward took part in the Joint All Domain Strategist (JADS) program at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Upon graduation, he began his studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell AFB. He is now stationed at Holloman AFB and is instructing the next generation of F-16C pilots.

Lt Col Hayward is currently a fighter pilot with over 760 hours in the F-16. Additionally, he has over 940 hours in the F-15E and over 750 total hours in combat.

Endnotes

¹Jeffrey Reilly, *Operational Design: Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive Action* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2012), 6.

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³Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (United States of America: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968), 27.

⁴Roger Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 67-69.

⁵Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 178.



CALL FOR PAPERS

Journal of Military Conflict Transformation

The Air Force Negotiation Center is now accepting submissions for the November Issue of the JMCT. The perspective theme for the issue is Trust. Even so, we invite you to submit works related to topics involving conflict transformation, conflict management, dispute resolution, negotiations, facilitation, and mediation as we look to include these areas.

The fall issue of the Journal of Military Conflict Transformation will continue to provide analytic tools for those interested in resolving conflicts at work, at home, or in the community. Papers submitted for this issue should address trust and its effect, both positive and negative on conflict transformation. Papers must be submitted no later than 15 September 2022. Please visit <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFNC/About-JMCT/to> review all submission guidelines.

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